College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty and Deans

2010

Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard
Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We
Should Keep It
Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law School, ajmees@wm.edu

Repository Citation
Meese, Alan J., "Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare
Standard and Why We Should Keep It" (2010). Faculty Publications. 554.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/554

Copyright c 2010 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

LAW REVIEW
VoLUME

85

JUNE

2010

NuMBER

3

ARTICLES
DEBUNKING THE PURCHASER WELFARE
ACCOUNT OF SECTION 2 OF THE
SHERMAN ACT: HOW HARVARD
BROUGHT US A TOTAL WELFARE
STANDARD AND WHY WE
SHOULD KEEP IT
ALAN

J.

MEESE*

The last several years have seen a vigorous debate among antitrust scholars and
practitioners about the appropriate standard for evaluating the conduct of monopolists under section 2 of the Sherman Act. While most of the debate over possible
standards has focused on the empirical question of each standard's economic
utility, this Article undertakes a somewhat different task: It examines the normative
benchmark that courts have actually chosen when adjudicating section 2 cases. This
Article explores three possible benchmarks-producer welfare, purchaser welfare,
and total welfare-and concludes that courts have opted for a total welfare normative approach to section 2 since the formative era of antitrust law. Moreover, this
Article will show that the commitment to maximizing total social wealth is not a
recent phenomenon associated with Robert Bork and the Chicago School of antitrust analysis. Instead, it was the Harvard School that led the charge for a total
welfare approach to antitrust generally and under section 2 in particular. The normative consensus between Chicago and Harvard and parallel case law is by no
means an accident; rather, it reflects a deeply rooted desire to protect practicesparticularly "competition on the merits"-that produce significant benefits in the
form of enhanced resource allocation, without regard to the ultimate impact on
purchasers in the monopolized market. Those who advocate repudiation of the
longstanding scholarly and judicial consensus reflected in the total welfare
approach to section 2 analysis bear the heavy burden of explaining why courts
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should, despite considerations of stare decisis, suddenly reverse themselves and
adopt such a different approach for the very first time, over a century after passage
of the Act.
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INTRODUCI'ION

The last several years have seen a vigorous debate among antitrust scholars and practitioners about the appropriate standard for
evaluating the conduct of monopolists under section 2 of the Sherman
Act. Many of these individuals have advocated a "no economic sense"
test, under which courts ask whether the monopolist's conduct would
have been economically rational for the firm in question without
regard to its exclusionary impact. Others have proposed a more intrusive "consumer welfare balancing test," under which courts seek to
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determine the net impact of a monopolist's conduct on purchasers in
the relevant market. Under this approach, courts would ban any conduct that reduced the welfare of such purchasers, without regard to
the conduct's overall impact on the welfare of society.
Most of the debate about these and other possible standards has
focused on their economic utility. In the lexicon of antitrust policy,
debate has centered on the question of which test produces the
optimal mix of false positives (instances in which courts condemn conduct they should not) and false negatives (cases in which courts fail to
condemn conduct they should). This debate is largely empirical, with
the outcome depending upon factors such as the competence of courts
at interpreting complex economic data, the impact of various standards-including the availability of treble damages-upon primary
conduct, and the extent to which economic forces-for example, the
entry of new competitors-will undermine monopolies that courts
mistakenly decline to condemn.
Lurking in the background, though, is a more fundamental question, the answer to which necessarily determines what counts as a false
negative or a false positive: What is it that renders conduct properly
subject to condemnation in the first place? There are several possible
answers to this question. For some, the mere fact that a monopolist's
conduct injures a rival may suffice to establish unlawful monopolization.l This "populist" or "producer welfare" standard would thus condemn a firm that, for instance, obtains a monopoly by realizing
economies of scale that allow it to underprice its smaller rivals. Others
would only condemn conduct that reduces the total wealth of society,
regardless of its impact on rivals or purchasers in the relevant market.
Under this "total welfare" approach, which is generally attributed to
Robert Bork and the Chicago School of antitrust analysis? the same
firm could underprice its rivals, drive them from the market, and
increase prices above the preexisting level, so long as the productive
1 Cf Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968) (condemning maximum
resale price maintenance agreements because, inter alia, practice could disadvantage small
dealers unable to realize efficiencies necessary to adhere to prices set by such agreements),
overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (suggesting that efficiencies that would result from merger militated against transaction because new entity would outcompete smaller rivals). As noted
later, the populist or producer welfare approach has fallen out of favor with the Court and
many scholars. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
2 See RoBERT H. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 107-15 (1978) [hereinafter BoRK,
AmrrRusT PARADox] (articulating economic model informing total welfare approach);
Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & EcoN. 7
(1966) [hereinafter Bork, Legislative Intent] (examining legislative history and concluding
that, in passing Sherman Act, Congress favored total welfare framework); see also infra
note 149 (collecting authorities attributing this view primarily to Bork).
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efficiencies from economies of scale outweigh the so-called "deadweight loss" resulting from the misallocation of resources flowing
from the resulting monopoly power. A third group would ban all conduct by a monopolist that reduces the welfare of purchasers in the
market that the defendant has purportedly monopolized, even if such
conduct increases society's overall welfare. 3 Under this middle-ground
"purchaser welfare" standard, the acquisition of monopoly due to
economies of scale would be unlawful whenever purchasers in the relevant market pay higher prices, even if the benefits of these economies far outweigh the deadweight loss associated with monopoly
pricing. In any event, the choice among the standards is inescapably
normative: Neither economic theory nor empirical inquiry can make
this choice for courts or the rest of society.
Whether a particular result counts as a false negative or a false
positive depends upon which normative premise one chooses. For
instance, condemnation of a restraint that injures rivals but increases
the welfare of purchasers and the rest of society will result in a false
positive for those who embrace the purchaser welfare or total welfare
benchmarks. However, the failure to condemn such conduct will produce a false negative for those operating under a framework focused
on the welfare of the monopolist's rivals. Likewise, for those who
embrace a purchaser welfare standard, validation of a restraint that
increases society's total wealth will lead to a false negative if the
restraint nonetheless slightly increases the prices paid by purchasers in
the relevant market. At the same time, condemnation of such a
restraint will produce a false positive if the operative standard is the
maximization of total social welfare.
Despite the pivotal nature of this choice between normative
premises, scholars and others who advocate various tests for section 2
3 See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 93-96 (1982) (arguing
that legislative history of Sherman Act demonstrates concern with harm to purchasers, not
allocative efficiency); Robert Pitofsky, Past, Present and Future of Antitrust Enforcement at
the Federal Trade Commission, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 209, 217 (2005) [hereinafter Pitofsky,
Antitrust Enforcement) (endorsing comparison of efficiency effects with adverse impacts on
consumers); Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed
Profit Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311,329-33 (2006) (endorsing so-called "consumer welfare effect standard" whereby courts determine whether restraint on balance
injures purchasers in relevant market); Robert Pitofsky, Testimony at a Public Hearing of
the Antitrust Modernization Commission 97-99 (Sept. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Pitofsky,
Testimony], available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/
050929_Exclus_Conduct_Transcript_reform.pdf (endorsing balancing test where ultimate
touchstone is "welfare of consumers," i.e., well-being of purchasers in relevant market); see
also Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 147, 148
(2005) (advocating test whereby court weighs harm to purchasers against benefits of challenged practice and bans practice when harms are disproportionate to benefits).
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liability generally avoid meaningful examination of this question.
Some argue that their preferred test should apply regardless of which
normative framework one accepts. 4 Others-including leading
enforcement officials-casually assert that their proposed approach is
consistent with the purported normative framework underlying a
mere handful of Supreme Court and circuit court precedents or that
the normative premise underlying section 2 should automatically replicate that applied under section 1,5 where courts at least purport to
balance a restraint's benefits against any harms imposed upon purchasers in that market. 6 Still others proceed without any apparent recognition that the test for analyzing alleged monopolistic conduct could
turn on the choice between competing normative frameworks. 7
Another scholar claims that the case law is ambiguous on the issue of
4 See, e.g., A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary Conduct-Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 389-93 (2006)
(providing arguments for "sacrifice test" that span justifications underlying different normative premises and arguing that test "reflects widely shared normative intuitions").
5 See Jonathan A. Jacobson & Scott A. Sher, "No Economic Sense" Makes No Sense
for Exclusive Dealing, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 779,793 (2006) (citing only three Supreme Court
and appellate court cases in support of argument against "no economic sense" test);
Pitofsky, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 3, at 217 (invoking single Supreme Court case
and single appellate court decision as basis for proposed balancing test); Pitofsky, Testimony, supra note 3, at 5 (same); Salop, supra note 3, at 333-35; see also Christine A.
Varney, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Vigorous Antitrust
Enforcement in This Challenging Era, 11-14 (May 12, 2009), available at http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245777.pdf (reading two Supreme Court decisions as
requiring determination of "whether on balance the net effect of [a monopolist's) conduct
harms competition and consumers" and ignoring numerous decisions taking different
approach).
6 Whereas section 2 of the Sherman Act focuses on anticompetitive single-firm conduct, section 1 bans only concerted action "in restraint of trade." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006);
see also Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,767-78 (1984) ("The
conduct of a single firm is governed by § 2 alone .... "). Section 1 claims are generally
judged under the "rule of reason" test first described in United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911), and later applied in many section 1 cases. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 111-13 (1984) (holding that benefits purportedly produced by restraint did not counterbalance harms for purposes of section 1 rule-ofreason analysis given factual finding that restraint resulted in prices higher than they otherwise would have been).
7 See Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis,
Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 8 GEo. MASON L. REv. 1, 30-36 (1999) (defending preferred test without attempting to justify particular welfare standard); Marina Lao, Defining
Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The Case for Non-universal Standards, 2006
FoRDHAM CoMPETITION L. INST. 433, 434-35 (deriving commendably precise section 2
standards without recognizing specific role of normative premises); see also ANTITRUST
Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, CoMPETITION AND MoNOPOLY: SINGLE FIRM CoNDUCT
UNDER SECTION 2 oF THE SHERMAN Acr passim (2008), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
reports/236681.pdf (withdrawn Apr. 2009) (repeatedly invoking "consumer welfare" as
touchstone of section 2 analysis without articulating definition of that term).
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normative premises. 8 Finally, some scholars make arguments that
depend upon one framework or the other without expressly
embracing or justifying their chosen premise. 9
There are, of course, various ways to determine which normative
standard should apply in evaluating a monopolist's conduct and thus
in assessing the validity of various tests. For instance, one could evaluate each standard in light of some independent moral criterion, such
as utility maximization, inherent justice, or the consequences of
various standards for the health of our political system. 10 Such an
approach would inevitably require one first to explain why the chosen
criterion is preferable to others. Or, one could take the more mundane approach of discerning the original meaning of section 2-that
is, determining which particular standard Congress meant courts to
apply. Over the past few decades, antitrust scholars have expended
considerable energy in attempting to discern the original meaning that
Congress attributed to the term "monopolize" in section 2 of the
Sherman Act.ll
This Article undertakes a somewhat different inquiry, one that
fills a significant gap in the scholarly literature: What is the normative
8 Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a
Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 21-23 (2004) (contending that case law is not clear on
which effects matter when examining conduct by monopolist that both creates market
power and produces benefits).
9 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 15-16
(1984) (resting argument for relatively permissive antitrust rules on unelaborated assumption that misallocation of resources is only harm from monopoly pricing).
10 For instance, some scholars have embraced a form of economic democracy as a
moral criterion, arguing that protecting smaller, less efficient firms from more efficient
rivals can preserve a decentralized marketplace and thus reduce the risk of corporate fascism. See Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051,
1053-54 (1979) (suggesting that some monopolies could have disruptive political effects). It
should be noted that a "total utility" standard might produce results different from those
produced by a "total economic welfare" standard, particularly if one assumes a diminishing
marginal utility of wealth. For instance, a merger to monopoly that increases total economic welfare by producing economies of scale may nonetheless reduce overall social
utility by transferring a significant share of income from poor consumers to the rich shareholders of the resulting monopoly. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, 59 AM. EcoN. REv. 105, 108-09 (1969). But see Frank H.
Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1696, 1704 (1986) ("The observation that money is worth different amounts at the margin to different people could as
easily direct income toward the 'utility monster' (the person who gets fabulous pleasure
from oodles of extra money or from gruesome deeds) as toward consumers or small
businesses.").
11 See, e.g., David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, G1 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1219, 1275-92 (1988) (describing political and economic assumptions that shaped
Congress's view of meaning of Sherman Act); Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at
26-31 (arguing that concerns about consumer welfare and efficiency were central to legislators' understanding of Sherman Act's prohibitions).
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framework that courts actually have chosen when adjudicating section
2 cases? The Article concludes that, despite some twists and turns
along the way, courts have not embraced purchaser welfare as the fundamental value underlying section 2. Indeed, the author is aware of no
decision in which a court implementing section 2 has employed purchaser welfare as the operative standard. At the same time, courts
have repeatedly adopted tests that effectively implement a total welfare approach to antitrust regulation.
The Article also evaluates the claim, made by those who support
a purchaser welfare approach, that support for the total welfare
approach originated with, and is limited to, Robert Bork and the
Chicago School of antitrust. To be sure, Bork has been the most vociferous proponent of a total welfare approach to antitrust law. However, the modern total welfare approach enjoys much broader
academic support and deeper roots than its opponents care to admit.
This Article traces the origins of the total welfare standard to the
influential Harvard School of antitrust analysis, which can in turn
trace its origins to the late 1930s and the work of Edward Mason, then
a leading member of the Harvard Economics Department. The
Harvard School treated antitrust law as a vehicle for implementing
neoclassical price theory's industrial organization paradigm as a
means of ensuring an allocation of productive resources that maximized overall economic welfare.12 This school of thought, which
included Mason disciples Carl Kaysen, Donald Turner, and Joe Bain,
exercised significant influence on antitrust law both directly and indirectly via the work of Phillip Areeda, Turner's co-author during the
1970s.
While Harvard and Chicago have on occasion supported different
rules governing particular categories of conduct, particularly under
section 1 of the Sherman Act, their disagreements often rest on different appraisals of the economic impact of particular conduct and not
on different normative premises. Moreover, with regard to section 2,
the normative consensus between Chicago and Harvard and parallel
case law is by no means ambiguous or accidental: It reflects a wellconsidered and deeply rooted desire to protect practices-particularly
"competition on the merits"-that produce significant benefits in the
form of enhanced resource allocation, without regard to the ultimate
impact of the practice on purchasers in the particular market served
by the monopolist. Those who advocate repudiation of the longstanding scholarly and judicial consensus reflected in the total welfare
approach to section 2 analysis bear the heavy burden of explaining
12

See infra Part IV.B.
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why courts should, despite considerations of stare decisis, suddenly
reverse themselves and adopt such a different approach for the very
first time, over a century after passage of the Act.
Part I of this Article describes three possible normative
frameworks that courts could adopt when implementing section 2 and
briefly explains the consequences of each for antitrust doctrine. The
choice between these frameworks largely depends upon what counts
as harm for the purposes of the antitrust laws. Part II examines the
normative framework courts adopted in the formative era of antitrust
law-1890 through the 1920s-particularly as illustrated by the first
iteration of United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. 13 Part III
examines the most intrusive approach to section 2 that a court has
adopted. Decided shortly after World War II, United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America 14 (Alcoa) implicitly rejected the total welfare approach to section 2 embraced during the formative era. Yet
Judge Hand, Alcoa's author, did not embrace a purchaser welfare
approach, endorsing instead an approach designed to further the
noneconomic values of decentralization and deconcentration. Part IV
describes the Harvard School's embrace of a total welfare approach,
derived from the workable competition model of neoclassical price
theory. This approach, it is shown, found its way into section 2 doctrine in the reprise of United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. ,15 in
which the presiding judge relied on a special law clerk from the
Harvard School in announcing a distinction between "competition
based on pure merit," including the realization of economies of scale
on the one hand, and "conscious business policies," such as exclusionary agreements, on the other. The former was lawful per se,
without regard to the impact upon purchaser welfare; the latter was
unlawful. The decision's creation of a safe harbor for competition on
the merits set the tone for modem monopolization doctrine, a sensibility reinforced by the Harvard School's future academic work, which
repeatedly reiterated United Shoe's determination that competition
on the merits should be lawful per se, even when such conduct led to
higher prices for purchasers in the relevant market. Part V describes
modem section 2 doctrine, which continues to adopt a total welfare
standard, again at the behest of the Harvard School. This Part also
explains why such doctrine has an especially strong claim under the
principle of stare decisis. Part VI examines and finds wanting two possible counterarguments against this Article's claim that section 2 l~w
247 u.s. 32 (1918).
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
15 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd,
347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam).
13

14
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rests upon a total welfare foundation. The total welfare standard is
not, as some claim, an exception that applies to a small subset of conduct by monopolists but is instead the rule that applies to all conduct
that courts analyze under section 2. Further, the recent decision in
United States v. Microsoft Corp. ,16 with its invocation of standards
derived from section 1's rule of reason, did not in any way undermine
the judicial commitment to total welfare as the operative section 2
standard.
I
WHAT's HARM AND WHAT's NoT:
SECTION 2's PossiBLE NoRMATIVE PREMISES AND
WHY THE CHOICE OF PREMISE MATTERS

Section 2 of the Sherman Act forbids "monopoliz[ation]" and
"attempt(s] to monopolize." 17 From the beginning, antitrust courts
have required plaintiffs invoking section 2 to prove two elements: 1)
that the defendant possesses monopoly power in a relevant, properly
defined market, and 2) that the defendant has acquired or maintained
that power by means of exclusionary conduct. 18 Thus, mere possession
of a monopoly, even a durable one, does not violate section 2. 19
Instead, a defendant must have also employed some undesirable, i.e.,
"exclusionary," conduct to acquire or maintain that power. 20
As a conceptual matter, analysis of a monopolist's conduct entails
two discrete questions. First, what resulting effects render conduct
undesirable? And second, what effects does that conduct actually produce? Economic theory and related techniques of empirical investigation can help answer the second question by informing courts about
the effects that conduct has in the real world. At the same time,
although economic theory can suggest different normative premises, it
cannot itself answer the first question; that is, it cannot tell courts
253 F.3d 34 {D.C. Cir. 2001).
15 u.s.c. § 2 (2006).
18 See, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480-81
{1992); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 {1966); see also Aspen Skiing
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595-96 {1985) (quoting instructions to
this effect with approval).
19 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 {1911) (stating that Sherman
Act does not forbid "monopoly in the concrete").
zo See, e.g., United States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708 (1927) (stating that
section 2 does not make mere size an offense); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co.,
247 U.S. 32, 69 (1918) (stating that section 2 does not forbid normal conduct that preserves
monopoly); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 178-79 (1911) (stating that
section 2 only forbids "undu[e]" restraints that lead to or protect monopoly).
16

17
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which effects constitute the sort of harm that section 2 is designed to
police. 21
Antitrust scholars have articulated three possible organizing normative principles that could drive antitrust doctrine. The "populist" or
"producer welfare" school argues that the Sherman Act, including
section 2, bans any conduct that restrains the autonomy of traders or
results in a concentrated marketplace. 22 Under this approach, tying or
exclusive dealing agreements should be unlawful without more if
entered into by a monopolist because such agreements restrain
dealers and disadvantage the firm's rivals. 23 By the same token,
above-cost pricing that drives less efficient firms from the market
would also violate section 2, even if such pricing reduced the prices
paid by purchasers in the relevant market over the short, medium, and
long term. 24
On the opposite extreme are those who advocate a "total welfare" approach to the Act. These scholars and jurists contend that
antitrust law bans only those contracts or practices that reduce
society's overall economic welfare. 25 Under this approach, values such
as autonomy and decentralization are irrelevant-only wealth matters.26 Also under this approach, conduct that creates wealth on balance should be lawful even if purchasers in the relevant market pay
higher prices as a result of the practice. For these proponents, the only
2l See MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in EssAYS IN PosiTIVE EcoNOMICS 1, 5-8 (1953) (explaining how positive economics can inform policy judgments but cannot itself tell policymakers what normative principles to embrace).
22 See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66
CoRNELL L. REv. 1140, 1147 (1981) (concluding that Sherman Act was designed in part to
protect small firms from power of trusts); id. at 1184 (endorsing per se rule against vertical
minimum and maximum price fixing because "sellers of goods should have the freedom to
charge the price they see fit").
23 See Eleanor M. Fox, Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, Inc.: Information
Failure as Soul or Hook, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 759, 759-61 (1994) (articulating this vision of
section 2).
24 See, e.g., Indus. Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 1342-43
(9th Cir. 1970) (finding violation of section 2 in efficiency-based forward integration that
injured rivals); see also Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968) (treating
above-cost maximum price-setting as harmful for section 1 purposes), overruled by State
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
25 See BaRK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 107-15; see also Easterbrook,
supra note 10, at 1703 ("[T]he dominant theme [of the legislative history] is the protection
of consumers from overcharges. This turns out to be the same program as one based on
'efficiency.' There are differences at the margins, such as what if anything to do about price
discrimination ... but the differences are not very important.").
26 See BaRK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 107-15 (arguing that "all antitrust
problems" turn on "only two factors"-"allocative inefficiency and productive efficiency");
see also Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 1703 (arguing that statements in legislative history
of Sherman Act evincing concern for welfare of small firms were "a sideshow").
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cognizable harm for antitrust purposes is what economists call the
"deadweight loss"-the loss in total economic welfare that occurs
when the exercise of monopoly power results in higher prices, lower
consumption, and an incremental reduction in output. 27 This welfare
loss, in turn, equals the difference between the value that consumers
would have placed on the foregone output and the cost of producing
it. Because this cost reflects the value of the next best use of the productive resources in question, the difference between value and cost
represents a misallocation of resources to other, less valuable uses. 28
The classic example of conduct that increases total wealth while
increasing purchaser prices-that is, conduct that would not violate
section 2 under a total welfare approach-is a merger to monopoly
that enhances the remaining firm's market power and increases prices
in the relevant market, but also results in productive efficiencies that
outweigh the deadweight losses that result from additional market
power. 29 Indeed, Professor Oliver Williamson has shown that a
merger to monopoly that reduces production costs by one or two percent may create more wealth than it destroys, even if the transaction
results in higher prices in the relevant market. 30
Under a third approach, what this Article calls the purchaser welfare standard, courts should ban all conduct that creates market power
and thus raises prices that parties pay in the relevant market. 31 It does
not matter for these scholars if a practice produces benefits that counterbalance allocative losses and thus enhances total welfare. Congress,
these scholars say, passed the Sherman Act to provide purchasers with
a legal entitlement to purchase goods and services at low prices. 32 For
these scholars, proof that conduct produces efficiencies is only relevant if those efficiencies counteract any price effects and prevent the
27 See BoRK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 108 (noting that deadweight loss
diagram "can be used to illustrate all antitrust problems").
28 /d. at 107-10; see also F.M. ScHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcoNOMIC PERFORMANCE 15-17 (1970) (describing how monopoly pricing results in inefficient
allocation of resources).
29 See BoRK, ANTITRUST PARADOx, supra note 2, at 107-10 (invoking allocative inefficiency-productive efficiency tradeoff model as paradigmatic approach to all antitrust
problems).
30 See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs,
58 AM. EcoN. REv. 18, 22-23 (1968).
31 See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 191, 201, 203
(2008); Lande, supra note 3, at 93-96; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected
Classes, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1, 21-24 (1989) (endorsing Professor Lande's reading of Act's
legislative history to support purchaser welfare theory).
32 See Lande, supra note 3, at 93-96 (arguing that Congress was concerned with ability
to '"unfairly' extract wealth from consumers," not allocative efficiency).
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conduct in question from increasing prices or, better yet, reduce such
prices. 33
Though once deemed controversial, 34 the purchaser welfare standard has gained ground in recent years. At the same time, support for
the populist or producer welfare standard seems to have waned significantly in recent years, leaving the total welfare and purchaser welfare
approaches as the most likely rivals for the best account of section 2. 35
Accordingly, this paper focuses on the rivalry between these two
vtews.
The distinction between the purchaser welfare and total welfare
standards is not always apparent. For one thing, both schools agree on
numerous doctrinal results; for example, both support the absolute
prohibition of cartel agreements. 36 Moreover, and perhaps more
importantly, both camps have described their goals using the same
label: the maximization of consumer welfare. 37 However, despite this
common label, the respective schools embrace quite distinct principles. One camp would protect the welfare of all consumers, including
those who are also shareholders in large firms with market power. 38
33 See Salop, supra note 3, at 317-18, 330-31; cf Alan A. Fisher, Frederick I. Johnson
& Robert H. Lande, Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 77 CAL. L. REv. 777, 785-88

(1989) (advocating similar approach in merger context).
34 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals' Costs To Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 279 (1986) (opining that
treatment of "monopoly transfer" from producers to consumers as aspect of consumer
welfare is "controversial").
35 Indeed, one prominent and former supporter of the populist approach to the
Sherman Act has more recently advocated a purchaser welfare approach. Compare
Pitofsky, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 3, at 217 (endorsing comparison of efficiency
effects with adverse effects on purchasers), and Pitofsky, Testimony, supra note 3, at 97-99
(endorsing balancing test where ultimate touchstone is welfare of consumers, i.e., purchasers in the relevant market), with Pitofsky, supra note 10, at 1051 {advocating approach
whereby courts consider political values such as decentralization of power when constructing antitrust doctrine).
36 See BoRK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 66-67 (discussing per se ban on
price fixing); Robert H. Lande & Howard P. Marvel, Three Types of Collusion: Fixing
Prices, Rivals, and Rules, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 941, 944-46 (same); see also Easterbrook,
supra note 10, at 1703 (noting that there are only "differences at the margins" between
purchaser welfare and total welfare approaches). Both schools of thought would also, by
their own terms, ban mergers that create market power without creating any offsetting
efficiencies as well as mergers that create efficiencies so trivial that they do not offset the
deadweight losses created by the transaction.
37 See Salop, supra note 3, at 331 (conceding that "consumer harm" might be better
term for his proposed standard than "consumer welfare"). Compare id. at 329-35 (repeatedly invoking "consumer welfare" to refer to welfare of purchasers in monopolist's
market), with Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, passim {repeatedly using "consumer
welfare" to refer to overall welfare of all consumers, including shareholders of
defendants).
38 See BoRK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 110 (noting that shareholders of
monopolists are also consumers and that their welfare should count for antitrust purposes).
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The other camp, by contrast, would protect only the welfare of those
consumers who happen to be purchasers in the market in which the
defendant is operating at the time of litigation. 39 As a result, this
Article has, for the sake of exposition, renamed the schools and
employs the neutral and more precise terms "total welfare" and "purchaser welfare" to denote the normative premises embraced by these
competing camps.
The total welfare and purchaser welfare standards naturally suggest different tests for determining whether a monopolist's conduct
should be condemned. If administrative costs were zero, courts would
simply examine challenged conduct with care and determine whether
it enhanced the welfare of purchasers or society as a whole, depending
upon the normative standard selected. However, administrative costs
are real; courts cannot simply replicate a flawless economic analysis in
every antitrust case. 40 Thus, antitrust rules are necessarily imperfect
efforts to implement a particular normative standard in light of the
limited institutional capacities of courts. 41 That is to say, a rule may
seek to implement a particular normative standard without actually
condemning every instance of conduct that offends that standard in
the real world.
Recent debate over a particular test for liability illustrates the
role that both normative and administrative concerns can play in
debates over appropriate liability rules and highlights the possible
consequences of choosing one normative standard over another. Several scholars have advocated a "no economic sense" test, whereby a
monopolist only violates section 2 if its conduct "would make no economic sense for the defendant but for the tendency to eliminate or
lessen competition." 42 Under this test, a monopolist will avoid liability
if its conduct produces nontrivial benefits that would explain its
behavior in the absence of monopoly power or the desire to protect or
obtain it. 43 While proponents of the test rarely invoke a specific normative standard,44 the test most plausibly reflects a total welfare
39 See Salop, supra note 3, at 331 (discussing harm to consumers in context of specific
market).
40 See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITI Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983)
(discussing practical constraints on court's economic investigation imposed by administrative costs).
41 See id. Uustifying existence of per se antitrust violations based on "the administrative
virtues of simplicity").
42 Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The "No
Economic Sense" Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 413 (2006).
43 Id. at 415-17.
44 Werden, for instance, invokes "consumer welfare" as the object of the test without
defining that term. See, e.g., id. at 415, 419.
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approach. In particular, the test's safe harbor for conduct that creates
significant benefits can be seen as reflecting an assumption, consistent
with Professor Williamson's tradeoff analysis, that the benefits of nontrivial efficiencies generally will outweigh any deadweight losses
resulting from enhanced market power. 45 Although the harmful
effects of market power and misallocation may sometimes
predominate, the cost of isolating such instances is presumably greater
than the benefits of doing so.
To be sure, some have argued that, in light of administrative
costs, the "no economic sense" test is also the best vehicle for implementing a purchaser welfare normative standard. 46 These scholars
argue that close scrutiny of a monopolist's conduct would chill beneficial innovation and the realization of efficiencies, thereby harming the
monopolist's purchasers in the long run. 47 At the same time, these
scholars generally reserve this argument for specific types of conduct,
such as pricing and output decisions, 48 while advocating a competing
and more intrusive "consumer welfare balancing test" to examine
other practices that purportedly raise greater risk of harm to purchasers, such as exclusionary agreements. 49 Under this so-called consumer welfare balancing test, courts examine directly whether such
practices, on balance, injure purchasers in the relevant market, in the
same way that courts purportedly "balance" the benefits of challenged
agreements against resulting harms when conducting a rule-of-reason
analysis under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 50
Arguments for a "no economic sense" test based on a purchaser
welfare standard are necessarily contingent upon contestable pessimistic assumptions about the capacity of advocates, courts, and agen45 See Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 15-16 (resting argument for relatively permissive
antitrust rules on assumption that misallocation of resources is only harm from monopoly
pricing); see also supra note 29-30 and accompanying text (describing Williamson's
tradeoff analysis).
46 See, e.g., Lao, supra note 7, at 461-62 (arguing that, for certain forms of conduct,
proof of procompetitive benefits should serve as "absolute" affirmative defense, regardless
even of availability of alternatives that are less harmful to purchasers).
47 See, e.g., id. (reasoning that too much scrutiny will hinder "product redesign and
development decisions").
48 See, e.g., id. at 462-63.
49 See, e.g., id. at 456-58, 461-62 (advocating purchaser welfare balancing test for
monopolist's distribution strategies on theory that such conduct poses greater risk of
overall harm to purchasers than purely unilateral pricing decisions).
50 See Salop, supra note 3, at 329-35 (endorsing what amounts to consumer welfare
balancing test whereby courts determine whether restraint on balance injures purchasers in
relevant market); Pitofsky, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 3, at 217 (endorsing comparison of efficiency gains with adverse effects on purchasers); see also infra notes 309-11, 316
and accompanying text (discussing purported balancing test akin to rule-of-reason
analysis).
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cies to distinguish beneficial conduct from that which creates harm
and to quantify the positive and negative consequences of such conduct.51 In September 2008, the Department of Justice's Antitrust
Division rejected the purchaser welfare effects test for exactly these
reasons. 52 Just eight months and one presidential election later, the
Division reversed itself, apparently embracing a purchaser welfare
effects test and rejecting the sort of administrative concerns that had
motivated the 2008 conclusion. 53 Thus, it seems plain that the selection of one normative standard over another can have a significant
and perhaps dispositive impact on the choice between possible tests
for evaluating a monopolist's conduct.
II
ToTAL WELFARE IN THE FoRMATIVE ERA

A.

The Safe Harbor for "Normal" Conduct and the
Efficient Monopolist

Proponents of a total welfare account of section 2 doctrine can
trace the theory's roots back almost a century to Standard Oil Co. v.
United States 54 and United States v. American Tobacco Co. ,55 decided
in the same month in 1911. These and subsequent decisions during
antitrust law's formative era embraced standards that were consistent
with a total welfare approach-and inconsistent with a purchaser welfare standard-to section 2, at least in those industries in which firms
could acquire and maintain monopoly power by engaging in efficient
conduct. Moreover, as explained in subsequent Parts, the section 2
standards announced during the formative era survive to this day and
apply even in those industries in which firms may acquire and maintain permanent monopoly power by means of conduct that is unambiguously beneficial.
51 Adjudicatory and forensic techniques may even evolve in response to the choice of a
particular standard. Cf. Williamson, supra note 10, at 113 (contending that recognition of
efficiency defense in merger context would cause parties and others to develop new techniques measuring impact of such transactions).
52 See CoMPETITION AND MoNOPOLY, supra note 7, at 37-38 (noting criticism of
"effects-balancing test" as "not easily administrable").
53 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on
Antimonopoly Law (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_
releases/2009/245710.htm (announcing and explaining rationale for withdrawal); Varney,
supra note 5, at 11-14 (explaining withdrawal of Section 2 Report and endorsing test that
determines "whether on balance the net effect of [a monopolist's] conduct harms competition and consumers").
54 221 u.s. 1 (1911).
55 221 u.s. 106 (1911).
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Like earlier formative-era decisions, both Standard Oil and
American Tobacco read sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act narrowly
so as not to infringe upon liberty of contract. 56 Some have even criticized the decisions on this ground. 57 During this era, the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments placed meaningful
limits on the ability of Congress and the states to regulate private economic activity, including pricing decisions and commercial contracts. 58
56 Am. Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 179-80; Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58-63; see also Alan J.
Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REv. 1, 34-67 (1999)
(detailing influence of liberty of contract considerations on Sherman Act doctrine from
1890 unti119ll); RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992, at
58 (1996) ("Standard Oil can be understood as closing Lochner's circle of individual liberty, its vision of a private sphere defined in opposition to a public, majoritarian domain.").
Some have suggested that Standard Oil's invocation of and reliance upon liberty of
contract to narrow the scope of the Sherman Act was a departure from earlier case law
which, it is said, preferred a more interventionist approach that banned any restraint of
trade without regard to reasonableness. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 85-97 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (contending that earlier case law and terms of statute rejected rule of reason);
Edwin S. Corwin, The Antitrust Acts and the Constitution, 18 VA. L. REv. 355, 369 (1932)
(characterizing Standard Oil as "judicial legislation" on these grounds); Millon, supra note
11, at 1288 n.314 (claiming that early decisions applied statute literally, and Standard Oil
changed that course); PERITZ, supra, at 26-29, 50--58 (contending that early case law
rejected liberty of contract in favor of more expansive interpretation of Sherman Act but
that Standard Oil reversed course of earlier decisions).
However, as I have argued elsewhere, the reasonableness approach taken by the
Standard Oil Court was entirely consistent with previous Sherman Act case law. Meese,
supra, at 12; see also Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 64-65 (explaining that previous decisions
had implicitly resorted to reason when looking to "nature" and "character" of challenged
contracts); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 567-68 (1898) (stating that
section 1 of Sherman Act does not forbid restraints of trade where effect is "indirect or
incidental only" because Act "must have a reasonable construction or else there would
scarcely be an agreement or contract among business men that could not be said to have,
indirectly or remotely, some bearing upon interstate commerce, and possibly to restrain it"
(quoting Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898))); Robert H. Bork, The Rule
of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775,
801--05 (1965) [hereinafter Bork, Rule of Reason I] (arguing that substance of law was not
changed at all in Standard Oil); WILLIAM LETWIN, LAw AND EcoNOMIC PoucY IN
AMERICA: THE EvoLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST Acr 265 (1956) (arguing that
White's opinion in Standard Oil changed nothing). Moreover, William Howard Taft agreed
that Standard Oil was entirely consistent with previous case law. See Cline v. Frink Dairy
Co., 274 U.S. 445, 460-61 (1927) (Taft, C.J.) (stating that Standard Oil "fully confirmed"
earlier case law); WILLIAM HowARD TAFT, THE ANTITRUST Acr AND THE SuPREME
CouRT 89 (1914) ("[T]hose who charged that the court had narrowed the act, or had not
comprehended the settled public opinion that found expression in it, spoke without
knowledge.").
57 See Corwin, supra note 56, at 367-71 (criticizing Court's decision as "predetermined
result").
58 See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 179-80 (1908) (voiding federal statute
that outlawed discharge of employees due to labor union membership); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (voiding state maximum hours legislation); Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897) (voiding state effort to regulate terms of insurance
contract entered in another state).

June 2010]

DEBUNKING THE PURCHASER WELFARE ACCOUNT

675

As a result, the Court said, the Sherman Act does not ban so-called
"normal" or "ordinary" contracts or combinations, even if they
restrain trade as a matter of plain meaning. 59 Indeed, the Court said, a
ban on such agreements would grind interstate commerce to a halt
and destroy contractual liberty instead of facilitating its exercise, as
intended. 60 Moreover, the Court said, the Sherman Act did not forbid
"monopoly in the concrete," but, instead, only monopoly acquired or
maintained by means of "undu[e]" or "improper[]" tactics. 61 In so
doing, the Court reached the result presaged almost a decade earlier
in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, where the controlling vote
opined that the rights to own and dispose of property and to make
ordinary contracts place significant limits on the scope of the Sherman
Act, including section 2, with the result that the Act bans only unreasonable restraints.62
The implication of these decisions seems obvious: While firms
may not obtain or sustain monopoly power via undue restraints, they
may do so via restraints or other tactics that are "ordinary," "normal,"
or "due." Moreover, while the Court did not define the category of
59 Am. Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 183; see also Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 60 (arguing that,
despite language that was "broad enough to embrace every conceivable contract,"
Sherman Act "necessarily called for the exercise of judgment" in evaluating challenged
agreements); see also Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. at 568 ("An agreement entered into for
the purpose of promoting the legitimate business of an individual or corporation, with no
purpose to thereby affect or restrain interstate commerce, and which does not directly
restrain such commerce, is not, as we think, covered by the Act, although the agreement
may indirectly and remotely affect that commerce.").
60 See Am. Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 180 (stating that Standard Oil Court gave term
"'restraint of trade' ... a meaning which would not destroy the individual right to contract
and render difficult if not impossible any movement of trade in the channels of interstate
commerce"); Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 63 (noting that literal application of statute "would
be destructive of all right to contract or agree or combine in any respect whatever as to
subjects embraced in interstate trade or commerce"); Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. at
567-68 (reading Act narrowly lest it ban all manner of normal and ordinary contracts); see
also Whitwell v. Cont'l Tobacco Co., 125 F. 454, 460-61 (8th Cir. 1903) (Sanborn, J.)
("There is nothing in the [Sherman Act] which deprived any of these competitors of these
rights [of contract]. If there had been, the law itself would have destroyed competition
more effectually than any contracts or combinations of persons or of corporations could
possibly have stifled it.").
61 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 62 ("[T]he omission of any direct prohibition against
monopoly in the concrete ... indicates a consciousness that the freedom of the individual
right to contract when not unduly or improperly exercised was the most efficient means for
the prevention of monopoly ...."); see also Am. Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 179 ("It was therefore pointed out [in Standard Oil] that the statute did not forbid or restrain the power to
make normal and usual contracts to further trade by resorting to all normal methods,
whether by agreement or otherwise, to accomplish such purpose.").
62 193 U.S. 197, 361 (1904) (Brewer, J., concurring) ("[T]he general language of the
[Sherman] [A]ct is also limited by the power which each individual has to manage his own
property and determine the place and manner of its investment. Freedom of action in these
respects is among the inalienable rights of every citizen.").
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"normal" or "ordinary" conduct with great precision, close analysis
suggests the Court had in mind practices that a firm would have
adopted without regard to whether it possessed or expected monopoly
power. 63 Or, as the Court put it in Standard Oil, the statute did not
ban those contracts "entered into or performed with the legitimate
purpose of reasonably forwarding personal interest and developing
trade .... " 64 While such agreements might incidentally obtain or sustain a monopoly, they were nonetheless normal or usual and thus
lawful. 65 It seems, therefore, that a restraint could be normal or ordinary under the Standard Oil formulation even if it (incidentally) facilitated the exercise of market power to the detriment of purchasers in
the relevant market.
The Court confirmed this reading of "normal" or "ordinary" just
seven years after Standard Oil and American Tobacco in United States
v. United Shoe Machinery Co. 66 There, the United States argued that
the defendant had monopolized the market for shoe machinery, first
by merging with several rivals, and then by adopting various purportedly exclusionary practices that helped United Shoe acquire and
maintain its monopoly. These practices included United Shoe's policy
of leasing its machines instead of selling them outright, as well as its
use of so-called "full capacity clauses," which required lessees to
employ machines leased from United Shoe whenever the lessee had
work appropriate for United's machines, in preference to those purchased or leased from others. 67 The firm also required lessees to
employ its aftermarket maintenance and repair service, and it provided these services free of charge. 68
63 See Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL.
L. REv. 77, 83-89 (making this argument in more detail); see also Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171
U.S. at 568 (holding that Sherman Act only reaches contracts whose main purpose is to
restrain trade).
64 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58; see also id. at 55-56 (explaining with approval English
legislation repealing bans on engrossing and forestalling, because acts condemned by such
statutes "tended to fructify and develop trade" and that "an individual's right to trade
could not be protected by destroying such right").
65 See Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. at 568 (defining as "indirect" those restraints entered
"for the purpose of promoting the legitimate business of an individual or corporation, with
no purpose to thereby affect or restrain interstate commerce, and which does not directly
restrain such commerce"); United States v. Hopkins, 171 U.S. 578,600 (1898) (arguing that
Sherman Act was not intended to cover indirect or remote effects on commerce). As I
have explained elsewhere, the Joint Traffic Ass'n Court held that the Act does not ban
"indirect" restraints as a means of avoiding regulation of what it called "ordinary contracts
and combinations." Meese, supra note 56, at 53-54.
66 247 u.s. 32 (1918).
67 See id. at 61-63 (detailing various lease provisions challenged by United States).
68 See id. at 56 ("There is a service force as well, estimated at 6,000 men, to repair
immediately breaks or deterioration without extra charge.").
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There was no doubt that such agreements disadvantaged rivals
and thus protected the defendant's monopoly position in the shoe
machinery market. 69 Nonetheless, the Court considered this factor to
be beside the point, finding that the agreements in question produced
benefits independent of any propensity to obtain or maintain
monopoly power.7° In particular, the Court described specific benefits
created by the restraints and found that the transactions in question
were motivated by considerations that "move[ ] and may move the
transactions of men." 71 Moreover, the Court also found it noteworthy
that each of the firms that had merged to form the defendant had,
before the merger, employed the very same restraints. 72 The previous
employment of such restraints in a less concentrated market apparently suggested to the Court that the agreements produced benefits
unrelated to the creation or maintenance of market power, i.e., they
were "normal" or "usual," as the Standard Oil Court used those
terms. 73 It did not matter to the Court that the firm had become a
monopoly, as such market dominance was "at once the result and
69 Cf id. (noting that company had "magnitude," which was both "result and cause of
efficiency").
70 That is to say, the decision was an application of what is now known as the "no
economic sense" test. See, e.g., Werden, supra note 42 (articulating and arguing for this
test); Melamed, supra note 4, at 389-92 (articulating so-called "sacrifice test," which is
functionally equivalent to Werden's "no economic sense" test, supra, whereby conduct is
deemed anticompetitive "if, but only if, it makes no business sense or is unprofitable for
the defendant but for the exclusion of rivals and resulting supracompetitive recoupment").
71 United Shoe, 247 U.S. at 65; see id. at 63-64 (explaining that practice of leasing
machines helped finance entry of small shoe manufacturers and ensured that machines
were used in proper relation to other machines); id. at 64 (explaining that requirement that
lessees also lease accessory machines created "great economic advantage"); see also
William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 EMORY L.J. 1,
16-17 (1995) (explaining how United Shoe decision rested upon determination that challenged provisions were voluntary arrangements that benefitted both parties).
72 See United Shoe, 247 U.S. at 63 ("As we have seen, the leasing of their respective
machines was the practice of the constituent companies before their union and (the leases]
were substantially the same after union as before-in instances better.").
73 /d. at 65. Similarly, some modern courts and scholars have contended that restraints
that arise in unconcentrated markets are presumptively efficient. See Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 22 (1979) (finding that adoption by smaller firms of
so-called "blanket licenses" suggested that such agreements produced benefits independent of any market power and should thus be analyzed under rule of reason); Rothery
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.)
(noting that absence of market power creates inference that challenged restraints produce
efficiency benefits); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enter., 776 F.2d 185, 190-91 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Easterbrook, J.) (stating that absence of market power suggests restraint is beneficial or
benign); see also Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing
and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373,384-85 {1966) (hereinafter Bork, Rule of Reason
II] {"This inference that the price-fixing agreement enhances the efficiency of a contract
integration may safely be taken as conclusive without proof ... since the apparent market
share of the parties makes it highly improbable that the real purpose or effect of the
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cause of efficiency." 74 In more modern parlance, United Shoe was an
efficient monopolist. The Court reiterated these principles into the
1920s in its section 2 jurisprudence.7 5
Viewed from a modern perspective, these paradigmatic decisions
embrace the total welfare view of section 2 at the expense of the purchaser welfare view. Long before there was a Chicago School of antitrust analysis, these decisions declined to interfere with monopoliesand thus monopoly pricing-when the monopolist in question
obtained or maintained its power by engaging in normal or ordinary
practices that produced efficiencies. Such efficiencies, in turn, presumably outweighed any deadweight loss resulting from enhanced
monopoly power, thereby justifying validation of the practice. 76
"Mere size," without more, was not an offense, even if such size
empowered a firm to charge monopoly prices. 77
Moreover, such a result is consistent with-perhaps even compelled by-the Supreme Court's more general attitude toward economic regulation during this period.7 8 According to the Lochner-era
Court, the unequal distribution of wealth was an inevitable consequence of the state's fundamental obligation to protect what Madison
had called the "faculties of acquiring property." 79 This unequal distriarrangement is to restrict output."); Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 19-23 (proposing socalled market power filter for restraints analyzed under rule of reason).
74 United Shoe, 247 U.S. at 56.
75 See United States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708 (1927) (stating that section
2 of Sherman Act does not make "mere size" an offense); United States v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 440-41 (1920) (holding that defendant did not violate section 2 where
"[i]t resorted to none of the brutalities or tyrannies that the cases illustrate of other combinations"); id. at 450-51 (stating that mere size is not offense if obtained without exclusionary tactics); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (noting that
mere fact that restraint adopted by important industry participants alters prices does not
render it unlawful); see also MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CoRPORATE REcONSTRucnoN oF
AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916, at 136 (1988) ("[During the formative era] a literal
monopoly of manufacture or production achieved by a person or firm or corporation
through superior efficiency, or through effective and otherwise lawful competition, or
through expansion by the purchase of property, remained unobjectionable.").
76 See Williamson, supra note 30, at 20-22 (contending that small increase in efficiency
can outweigh allocative harm resulting from merger to monopoly).
77 Int'l Harvester, 274 U.S. at 708; see also U.S. Steel, 251 U.S. at 440-41 (finding no
violation of section 2 absent "brutalities or tyrannies").
78 See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915) (noting that disparity in bargaining
position does not justify legislative interference with liberty of contract); see generally
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908) (holding that Congress cannot ban socalled "yellow dog" contracts that prohibit employees from joining unions).
79 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 73 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The
protection of these faculties is the first object of government."); see also Coppage, 236 U.S.
at 17 ("[I]t is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the
right of private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights.").
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bution might confer bargaining power on the manufacturer, including
the power to charge prices above (or provide wages below) the level
that competition might produce. 80 However, such power and the distribution of property that created it was the necessary result of a
system of free contract and private property and could not itself justify
regulation. 81
Although the state could regulate private commercial activity
that fell within the "police power," this power has been described as
the power to combat "externalities" and nothing more. 82 Such power
did not include the general authority to abridge liberty of contract for
the bare purpose of transferring income from one class of individuals
to another. 83 Indeed, in Lochner itself, the Court characterized a law
with such an objective as a "labor law," a demeaning epithet within
the Lochner paradigm. 84 While the state could regulate prices charged
by firms "clothed with a public interest," such regulation simply interdicted cartel or monopoly pricing that exercised market power (and
thus misallocated resources) without any offsetting benefits. 85 Absent
80 See Coppage, 236 U.S. at 17 (conceding that parties will have different levels of bargaining power). But cf Alan J. Meese, Will, Judgement, and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice
Souter and the Mistranslation of Liberty, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 3, 38-39 (1999) ("There
is no logical relationship between an employer's wealth and its bargaining power."). Or, as
Judge Easterbrook explained in the antitrust context: "A dollar yardstick never measured
market power .... To show market power, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's
sales loom so large ... that a reduction in output by the defendant could not quickly be
made up by other firms' increased output." L.A.P.D., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 132 F.3d
402, 405 (7th Cir. 1997) (Easterbrook, J.).
81 Coppage, 236 U.S. at 17; see also Page, supra note 71, at 15-17 (contending that
United Shoe and other decisions of era reflected Coppage-like reasoning).
82 See HERBERT HoVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAw 200 (1994)
(explaining how scope of police power recognized in Lochner-era decisions replicated
scope of externality regulation endorsed by classical economic paradigm); Meese, supra
note 56, at 15-23 (describing scope of police power within classical economic paradigm
that Lochner-era Court embraced).
83 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 CoLuM. L. REv. 873, 878 n.27 (1987)
(explaining that Lochner-era jurisprudence rested upon strong preference for redistribution via generally applicable laws instead of regulation of private contracts); see also
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 557-59 (1923) (holding that state could not regulate wages to ensure health and welfare of employees because such welfare was not
employers' responsibility).
84 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) ("Viewed in the light of a purely labor
law, with no reference whatsoever to the question of health, we think that a law like the
one before us involves neither the safety, the morals nor the welfare of the public, and that
the interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected by such an act.").
85 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 133 (1876). Compare Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700,
747 (1878) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (reading Munn as approving price regulation where
"practical monopoly" was of such importance that "a tribute can be exacted from the community," thereby creating "common charge" or "burden on the citizen"); with Charles
Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 524, 538-44 (1923) (Taft,
C.J.) (holding that meatpacking factory was not sufficiently "clothed with a public interest"
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any proof that a contract or other practice reduced overall welfare, a
mere showing that the contract reflected a purportedly unfair bargain
between the parties to it would not justify regulation under this paradigm.s6 Under this view, purely normal business conduct that created
efficiencies, thereby producing or fortifying a monopoly, would be
beyond the scope of legitimate police power regulation and would
thus be protected by liberty of contract. 87

B.

Two Possible Caveats

There are, however, two caveats to any reliance upon formativeera jurisprudence to support a "total welfare" approach to section 2.
to justify wage regulation when plant had only 300 employees and $600,000 in capital stock,
and there were "many other packing houses in Kansas, of greater capacity").
86 See Meese, supra note 56, at 83-86 (developing this argument in more detail). To be
sure, the Lochner Court did sustain antitrust regulation that banned certain horizontal
cartels again~t liberty of contract claims. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,
175 U.S. 211, 227-38 (1899) (holding that liberty of contract does not protect direct
restraints of interstate trade forbidden by Sherman Act and finding that challenged cartel
raised prices well above level that ordinary competition would produce and thus was
"direct restraint"). Nonetheless, such cartel agreements were not "normal" conduct in the
sense used here because they produced no benefits-aside from above-cost pricing by the
defendants. See id. at 238-45 (finding that horizontal restraint that raised prices above
competitive level deprived defendants of right of ordinary competition and directly
restrained interstate commerce). Also, regulation of such restraints did more than simply
transfer income from conspiring producers back to purchasers. It also eliminated the sort
of deadweight allocative loss produced by naked cartel pricing, without destroying any
offsetting efficiencies. Thus, these precedents do not indicate that Lochner-era courts could
plausibly have read the Sherman Act to ban monopoly obtained by means of "normal"
conduct.
Some have argued that the framers of the Sherman Act could not have understood
that cartel pricing would result in a misallocation of resources, citing the fact that Alfred
Marshall did not publish his Principles of Economics, which first popularized the concepts
of deadweight loss and allocative inefficiency, until 1890-the same year that Congress
passed the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Antitrust, Law and Economics, and the
Courts, 50 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoss. 181,207--08 & n.140 (1987). As a result, these scholars
conclude that Congress must have meant to ban above-cost pricing simply because it
reduced the welfare of purchasers, without regard to any efficiencies created. However,
Alfred Marshall was not the first economist to recognize that above-cost pricing could
reduce total welfare. In 1776, Adam Smith argued that state-created monopolies would
"derange" the "natural distribution of the stock [capital] of society" and that "every derangement of the natural distribution of stock is necessarily hurtful to the society in which it
takes place." AoAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 682-83 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library 1994); see also E.G. West, The
Burdens of Monopoly: Classical Versus Neoclassical, 44 S. EcoN. J. 829, 836-38 (1978)
(arguing that Adam Smith understood allocative inefficiency as one burden of monopoly).
In any event, this Article examines the content of case law, announced and enforced by
judges, and not the intent of the Congress that passed the Sherman Act in 1890.
87 See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 566-68 (1898) (holding that
Sherman Act does not reach "ordinary contracts and combinations" that restrain interstate
commerce only indirectly).
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First, an argument that this jurisprudence rejected a purchaser welfare
version of section 2 rests upon the assumption that a firm can, in fact,
acquire or maintain a monopoly and raise purchaser prices simply by
engaging in what Standard Oil, American Tobacco, and United Shoe
would call "normal conduct." Absent this assumption, there would be
no such thing as an "efficient monopolist"; 88 all monopolies would be
the product of at least some conduct that excludes rivals without producing any benefits whatsoever. If so, then the era's safe harbor for
"normal" conduct would not reflect a decision to reject a purchaser
welfare standard, since such conduct could never, by itself, injure purchaser welfare if it could not create or maintain a monopoly.
However, modern antitrust scholars uniformly assume that a firm
may obtain or maintain a monopoly simply by means of normal conduct.89 The paradigmatic example of such conduct is above-cost
pricing that falls below competitors' prices (due perhaps to economies
of scale) and that drives less efficient firms from the marketplace,
thereby empowering the monopolist to raise prices. 90 This is what is
known as the "efficient monopolist."
The assumption that there could be an efficient monopolist was,
at the very least, controversial during the formative era. Indeed,
according to the classical economic paradigm, which was ascendant in
the nineteenth century, a firm could not maintain a monopoly absent
some assistance from the state or the use of private violence. 91 Adam
88 See generally HERBERT HoVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST PoLICY 29-31 (3d ed.
2005) (describing natural monopoly achieved because of economies of scale).
89 See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. SuLLIVAN & WARRENS. GRIMES, THE LAw oF ANTITRUST:
AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 73 (2000) (assuming that firms can achieve dominance by
merit and concluding that current law does not interdict such monopolies); Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Monopolization Offense, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1035, 1039-41 (2000) (listing
forms of conduct that constitute "competition on the merits" and "are welcomed by the
Sherman Act"); John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Monopolization, Innovation, and
Consumer Welfare, 69 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 367,387-92 (2001) (arguing that false positives
will deter societally productive conduct by monopolists); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists' Illegal Conduct Under the Sherman Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 809, 824-28
(2000) ("To punish a firm simply because it has achieved a monopoly is to discourage
superior business performance.").
90 See HovENKAMP, supra note 88, at 29-31.
91 See HoVENKAMP, supra note 82, at 282-83 ("Within the classical paradigm,
monopoly prices could never be earned ... unless people were artificially restrained from
entering."); Meese, supra note 56, at 15-23 (detailing assumptions of classical paradigm
and its conclusion that firms could not charge monopoly prices without state aid); see also,
e.g., ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JuRISPRUDENCE 363 (R.L. Meek eta!. eds., 1978) ("[I]f
any trade is overprofitable all throng into it till they bring it to the natural! price, that is,
the maintenance of the person and the recompense of the risque he runs .... "); Thomas
M. Cooley, Limits of State Control of Private Business, 1 PRINCETON REv. 233, 259-60
(1878) (contending that, absent state aid, firms could not price above competitive level
unless they departed from "regular business" methods and resorted to "violence and
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Smith had even suggested that those who feared the survival of
monopoly without state assistance might just as well fear witchcraft. 92
This assumption was so powerful that it led some jurists to argue that
price regulation of firms that had not received state aid was unconstitutional, even if the regulated firms were colluding with one another
in a concentrated market.93 According to these jurists, free entry
would prevent incumbent firms from pricing above the competitive
level, with the result that any regulation setting a price below that set
by the market would necessarily confiscate a portion of the defendant's property by preventing him or her from charging a reasonable
price. 94
Formative-era courts seemed to reject the assumption that state
assistance or independently tortious conduct was a sine qua non of
successful cartelization or achievement of monopoly. To be sure, early
decisions that banned cartel price-fixing by railroads emphasized that
the parties to the cartel, like the defendants in Joint Traffic, had
received special assistance from the state in the form of outright
grants of land and delegation of the power of eminent domain. 95 Such
state-created advantages raised the cost of entry for firms that had not
received such advantages. 96 Still, less than ten years after the Sherman
Act was passed, the Court banned horizontal price fixing among comterror"); George Gunton, The Economic and Social Aspects of Trusts, 3 PoL. Sci. Q. 385,
403 (1888) ("If the gates for the admission of new competitive capital are always open, the
economic effect is substantially the same as if the new competitor were already there
.... ").
92 SMITH, supra note 86, at 570-72.
93 See Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 548-52 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting); Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 142-53 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting). In both Munn and Budd, the
regulated firms had apparently agreed on common prices. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 131
(explaining how prices charged and received for storage were agreed upon and established
by different warehouses in Chicago from year to year).
94 Budd, 143 U.S. at 548-52 (Brewer, J., dissenting); Munn, 94 U.S. at 136-54 (Field, J.,
dissenting); see also LoUis D. BRANDEIS, Competition, in THE CuRsE OF BIGNESS 114
(Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., Kennikat Press 1965) ("[N]o monopoly in private industry in
America has yet been attained by efficiency alone."). It should be noted that at least some
judges recognized that a firm might obtain what economists would now call a natural
monopoly by realizing economies of scale. See People ex ret. Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682,
693 (N.Y. 1889) (Peckham, J., dissenting) (referring to example of matchstick company
that, because of greatness of its facilities, could make article cheaper and sell it at lower
price than its competitors). However, these jurists also believed that capital was sufficiently
mobile that, whenever a natural monopolist priced above normal level, another monopolist
would immediately take its place. See Walsh, 22 N.E. at 693 (Peckham, J., dissenting)
(opining that such monopoly could continue to exist only so long as other citizens chose to
keep out of business).
95 See, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 569-71 (1898).
96 See Meese, supra note 56, at 54-55 & n.270 (explaining how classical jurists assumed
that grant of eminent domain raised barriers to entry and thus protected incumbent cartelists from competition).
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peting firms simply because the cartel agreement had resulted in
prices well above the firms' costs plus a reasonable rate of return. 97
The defendants had received no special benefits from the state and
had not engaged in tortious activity that disadvantaged rivals. Moreover, in Standard Oil and American Tobacco, the Court condemned
the defendants for obtaining and fortifying monopolies without any
aid from the state, by means of conduct that was neither violent or
tortious, on the one hand, nor normal or ordinary, on the other. 98 That
is to say, the Court recognized that firms could create and maintain a
monopoly without state assistance or private violence. 99 This recognition was consistent with the work of several economists of the era,
who argued that very large firms could realize efficiencies not available to smaller entities. 100
At the same time, the Court still seemed to assume that purely
normal conduct could not lead to anything more than a transient
monopoly. When explaining why the Sherman Act did not forbid
"monopoly in the concrete" or ban "normal" or "ordinary" contracts
entered by defendants, the Standard Oil Court opined that the Act
depended upon the assumption that protection of the right of all
market participants to make normal and ordinary agreements of the
sort protected by liberty of contract would itself prevent sustained
monopoly:
[T)he operation of the centrifugal and centripetal forces resulting
from the right to freely contract was [according to the framers of the
Sherman Act] the means by which monopoly would be inevitably
prevented if no extraneous or sovereign power imposed it and no
97 See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 235-40 (1899)
(rejecting claim that restraint was indirect based upon lower court's findings that arrangement resulted in prices well above cost plus reasonable rate of return). The Court quoted
extensively from then-Judge Taft's findings in the Sixth Circuit that the challenged cartel
had charged unreasonable prices. See id. at 235-38 (quoting Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States, 85 F. 271, 291-93 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.)).
98 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 75 (1911) (finding that defendant
dominated industry "not as a result of normal methods of industrial development, but by
new means of combination which were resorted to in order that greater power might be
added than would otherwise have arisen had normal methods been followed"); United
States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911) ("[T]he history of the combination is
so replete with the doing of acts ... demonstrative ... of a purpose to acquire dominion
and control of the tobacco trade, not by the mere exertion of the ordinary right to contract
and to trade, but by methods devised in order to monopolize the trade by driving competitors out of business.").
99 See generally HoVENKAMP, supra note 82, at 268-95 (contending that rise of neoclassical economics resulted in revised conception of "coercion" that justified additional
regulation).
100 /d. at 218-21 (describing increasing recognition by economists during this era that
large combinations could create economies of scale).
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right to make unlawful contracts having a monopolistic tendency
were permitted. In other words that freedom to contract was the
essence of free!lom from undue restraint on the right to contract. 101

Thus, even if one firm employed ordinary or normal contracts to
obtain a (temporary) monopoly, the right of others to employ the very
same ordinary tactics would allow such other firms to enter the
market and undermine that temporary monopoly. 102 To the extent
that the formative-era Court believed that efficient conduct could not,
by itself, create or maintain a permanent monopoly, the safe harbor
for "normal" or "ordinary" conduct would not necessarily depend
upon a normative choice between purchaser welfare, on the one hand,
and total welfare, on the other.l 03 In this case, the Justices may have
seen no conflict, as purely positive economics taught them that efficient conduct could not by itself maintain a monopoly for long.l 04
Thus, such conduct would necessarily enhance the welfare of both
purchasers and the rest of society.
It is important not to overstate this point, however. Judicial
assumptions aside, it seems clear that, as some contemporary scholars
recognized, there were in fact efficient monopolists during this era
such that the test applied under section 2 fostered efficient monopolies to the detriment of purchaser welfare. 105 Moreover, while decisions such as Standard Oil assumed that monopolies obtained through
efficiency were necessarily transient, others exhibited no such assumption and, if anything, suggested the opposite. The United Shoe
Machinery monopoly, for instance, had thrived for nearly two
decades, maintained by conduct the Court held to be normal.l 06 Nor
did the rationale of the decision suggest or imply any expectation that
the firm's monopoly would dissipate any time soon. One might even
Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 62.
See People ex rei. Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 693 (N.Y. 1889) (Peckham, J., dissenting) (opining that new entrant could displace natural monopoly if latter raised price
above reasonable level).
103 But cf United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 63-65 (1918) (holding
that defendant had maintained its durable monopoly via purely normal tactics).
104 Cf FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 5-6 (explaining how positive economics can inform
policy judgments).
105 See, e.g., Arthur T. Hadley, Private Monopolies and Public Rights, 1 Q.J. EcoN. 28,
28 (1887) ("[C]orporations, in many instances, have a virtual monopoly in their own line of
business, which is at variance with all our theories of industrial freedom .... Where large
management is more economical and productive than small management, we shall find
large concerns or none at all.").
106 See United Shoe, 247 U.S. at 56 ("The company, indeed, has magnitude, but it is at
once the result and cause of efficiency, and the charge that it has been oppressively used is
not sustained .... There has been saving as well in the cost of manufacture of shoes."); id.
at 65 ("We see nothing else in the circumstances of the parties than that which moves and
may move the transactions of men.").
101

102
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characterize United Shoe's more realistic approach as a bridge to
modern decisions holding that competition on the merits and other
forms of efficient conduct survive section 2 scrutiny, 107 regardless of
any impact on the welfare of purchasers in the relevant marketplace.
This brings us to the second consideration that could undermine
the force of the formative era's protection for "normal" conduct.
Simply put, recognition that a particular doctrinal choice had its
source in Lochner and its support for liberty of contract may not recommend it in the eyes of most scholars or lawyers. Lochner, after all,
is generally viewed as a paradigmatic example of judicial activism, in
which the Court identified and protected a right-liberty of contract-found nowhere in the actual Constitution. 108 And of course,
the Supreme Court began to repudiate the doctrine of economic due
process more than seven decades ago. 109 Thus, to the extent that decisions such as United Shoe and Standard Oil were, in the Court's view,
compelled by its liberty of contract jurisprudence, the repudiation of
Lochner and its progeny would, some might argue, drain these decisions of any precedential significance and require modern courts to
look elsewhere for guidance when deciding which welfare standard to
embrace under section 2. 110 Some might therefore be dubious of
efforts to derive the current meaning of the Sherman Act from
formative-era decisions that read the Act to comply with constitutional norms that have been repudiated.
Nonetheless, there is little evidence that courts have found the
formative-era cases corrupted by association with Lochner. After all,
107 See infra Part IV.B (describing use of total welfare approach in second United Shoe
case); Part V.B (discussing Court's acceptance of total welfare framework in modern
cases).
108 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-62 (1992) (joint
opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (opining that Lochner was properly overruled); id. at 957 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same).
109 See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (declining to examine whether ban on
debt-adjusting by non-lawyers infringed liberty of contract); Williamson v. Lee Optical,
Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (according only rational basis scrutiny to state law that prohibited
opticians from fitting or duplicating lenses without prescription from ophthalmologist or
optometrist); United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (finding Filled Milk
Act, which prohibited shipment of certain ostensibly adulterated dairy products in interstate commerce, to be constitutional); W. Coast Hotels v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 38~00
(1937) (upholding minimum wage statute over constitutional challenge), overruling Adkins
v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
110 At the same time, one could not plausibly argue that the repudiation of Lochner and
its progeny mandates the rejection of a total welfare standard under section 2 once and for
all. Congress may well have chosen or anticipated that courts would apply a total welfare
standard under section 2, independent of any constitutional considerations. Indeed, Robert
Bork, a fierce opponent of substantive due process-and thus of protection for liberty of
contract-has argued exactly that, without invoking Lochner or its progeny. See infra Part
IV.A (describing Bork's arguments to this effect).

686

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:659

while modern courts profess no love for liberty of contract and similar
economic liberties, they repeatedly invoke Standard Oil as a foundational decision from which they derive various antitrust principles,
decades after Lochner and its progeny were cast aside. 111 Moreover,
since Lochner's demise, Congress has been free to overrule Standard
Oil by legislation but has declined to do so. The ignominy of Lochner
notwithstanding, liberty of contract lives on in antitrust doctrine until
Congress decides otherwise.
III
ALcoA's

PoPULIST DETOUR

It would be difficult, if not impossible, to examine the development of monopolization law without discussing Learned Hand's
famous Alcoa decision. Repeatedly cited by courts, scholars, and
advocates, the decision is often invoked for the proposition that socalled "competition on the merits" cannot violate section 2.
After Lochner's repudiation, Standard Oil-with its reliance on
liberty of contract-itself fell into some disrepute as an exemplar of
judicial activism and an unduly narrow interpretation of the Sherman
Act. 112 Soon thereafter, the scope of section 2 reached its maximum in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America 113 (Alcoa). There the
United States claimed that Alcoa had maintained its lawfully-obtained
monopoly through a variety of predatory tactics, including overbuying
of bauxite and exclusionary contracts with suppliers of electricity. 114
The government also charged Alcoa with repeatedly expanding its
capacity to meet new demand for its product, thereby preempting and
discouraging new entry .11 5 At the same time, there was no allegation
that Alcoa had priced its output of aluminum ingot below any measure of cost.
The trial court found that Alcoa had not, in fact, entered exclusionary agreements with input suppliers or engaged in other predatory
111 See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (citing
Standard Oil approvingly for reasonableness standard); Nat'! Soc'y of Prof'! Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-92 (1978) (describing rule-of-reason analysis as rising out
of Standard Oil); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211 (1959)
(referring with approval to Standard Oil as "landmark case" that articulated fundamental
section 1 principles).
112 See Corwin, supra note 56, at 366-69 (criticizing narrowness of Standard Oil Court's
interpretation of Sherman Act).
113 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
114 For instance, the government claimed that Alcoa purchased more bauxite than it
required and also entered into exclusive agreements with firms that generated hydropower; both tactics were allegedly intended to prevent rivals from entering the market. See
id. at 432-34 (describing these allegations).
115 Id. at 430-31.
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tactics and entered judgment for the defendant. 116 Because several
Justices of the Supreme Court recused themselves, the case was
assigned to a panel of the Second Circuit to act for the Supreme
Court. In an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, the court affirmed the
trial court's factual findings with one or two minor exceptions.l 17 This
decision seemed to set up a clean question of law: whether a firm that
maintained a monopoly solely via "normal" or "usual" conducthere, expanding to meet consumer demand-offended section 2.
After determining that Alcoa was, in fact, a monopolist, Hand
recognized that mere possession of a monopoly did not violate section
2.11 8 Reviewing the authorities with great care, he acknowledged
various decisions stating that the acquisition or maintenance of
monopoly by means of ordinary or normal conduct did not, without
more, violate section 2. 119 And, he said, there was a strong argument
for this position. After all, some firms may obtain a monopoly "merely
by virtue of ... superior skill, foresight and industry." 120 To be sure,
the failure to intervene in such cases might "expose the public to the
evils of monopoly." 121 But such conduct was the very thing the
Sherman Act was designed to encourage, so that any monopoly was
"the resultant of those very forces which it is its prime object to foster:
finis opus coronat." 122 Or, as Hand even more colorfully put it, "The
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be
turned upon when he wins." 123
Scholars, judges, and practitioners alike have repeatedly quoted
this language as evidence that Hand embraced a safe harbor for efficient monopolists, thereby embracing, at least implicitly, a total welfare test.1 24 And yet, Hand seemed to distance himself-and the lawfrom this colorful phrasing, claiming that cases evincing this view were
no longer good law. 125 Instead of relying upon the larger body of
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 44 F. Supp. 97, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 432-39 (affirming most of trial court's factual findings but
reversing trial court's finding that Alcoa had not engaged in "price squeeze" that helped it
acquire power in downstream market for sheet aluminum).
118 See id. at 429 ("It does not follow because 'Alcoa' had such a monopoly, that it
'monopolized' the ingot market: it may not have achieved monopoly; monopoly may have
been thrust upon it.").
119 !d. at 429-30.
12o !d. at 430.
121 !d.
122 /d. Finis opus coronat is traditionally translated as: "The end crowns the work."
123 !d.
124 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en bane)
(per curiam) (quoting this statement with approval); Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of
Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1413 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) (same); PHILLIP
AREEDA & DoNALD F. TuRNER, ANTITRUST LAw 'li 622a (1978) (same).
125 See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430.
116
117
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formative-era case law, Hand cited a single Supreme Court decision
for the proposition that a monopolist's size carried with it an opportunity for abuse and that such abuse would violate section 2. 126 He did
not elaborate on the definition of "abuse."
After suggesting that section 2 should not "turn[ ] upon" efficient
monopolists, Hand seemed to do exactly that, condemning Alcoa
because it had repeatedly expanded its output to meet the needs of
consumers.1 27 As Hand put it:
It was not inevitable that [Alcoa] should always anticipate increases
in the demand for ingots and be prepared to supply them. Nothing
compelled it to keep doubling and redoubling its capacity before
others entered the field. It insists that it never excluded competitors;
but we can think of no more effective exclusion than progressively
to embrace each new opportunity as it opened, and to face every
newcomer with new capacity already geared into a great organization, having the advantage of experience, trade connections, and the
elite of personne1.12s

Hand did not claim that Alcoa had priced its output of ingot below
any measure of cost or that Alcoa's conduct was only rational for a
firm that possessed or hoped for market power. In short, Judge Hand
condemned what modern antitrust courts and scholars would call
"competition on the merits."129
While Hand rejected a safe harbor for efficient monopolists, he
did not embrace a purchaser welfare standard. At no point did he
endorse balancing the conduct's costs or harms against its benefits or
otherwise attempting to determine whether the exercise of "skill, foresight and industry" that maintained Alcoa's monopoly enhanced or
reduced purchaser prices. To the contrary, when examining whether
Alcoa in fact possessed a monopoly, he noted that any comparison of
costs and benefits of a firm's conduct, while proper under section 1 of
the Sherman Act, was out of bounds whenever "the contract is made
with intent to set up a monopoly." 130 Moreover, in discussing the
rationale for the prohibition of monopoly, Judge Hand opined that
Congress meant to ensure a particular, deconcentrated market struc126 /d. at 430 ("Mere size ... is not an offense against the Sherman Act unless magnified
'to the point at which it amounts to a monopoly ... but size carries with it an opportunity
for abuse that is not to be ignored when the opportunity is proved to have been utilized in
the past."' (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932))).
127

ld.

/d. at 431.
See A. A. Poultry v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396, 1403-04 (7th Cir. 1989)
(explaining that expanding to meet new demand is quintessential competition that law
encourages); see also infra notes 176-82 and accompanying text (describing judicial creation of safe harbor for competition on merits).
130 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 428.
128

129

June 2010]

DEBUNKING THE PURCHASER WELFARE ACCOUNT

689

ture, for reasons unrelated to costs and prices. 131 In support of this
assertion, Hand cited dicta in the Court's early decision in United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, suggesting that the Sherman
Act was designed to protect "small dealers and worthy men" from
cartels that reduced prices.l32 In this way, Judge Hand anticipated a
similar conclusion by the Supreme Court more than a decade later in
the context of mergers and section 1. In 1962, the Court suggested that
the propensity of a merger to create efficiencies actually militated
against it, since the transaction could disadvantage smaller firms.l3 3
Four years later, the Court held that mergers would offend section 7
of the Clayton Act if they produced a certain level of concentration,
even if they resulted in lower consumer prices. 134 Each decision cited
Hand's assertion that the Sherman Act aimed at a decentralized
market structure despite the possible cost of such a policy to purchasers in the relevant market.l 35 A few years later, the Court condemned maximum resale price maintenance, in part because the
practice could injure inefficient dealers.l3 6 Thus, Hand rejected both
total and purchaser welfare standards, in favor of a populist, producer
welfare standard that advanced noneconomic values such as the
decentralization of economic decisionmaking.

131 See id. at 429 ("Throughout the history of these statutes it has been constantly
assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in
spite of possible costs, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other.").
132 See 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897). The language in question was dicta because there was
no allegation that the challenged cartel reduced prices or otherwise injured small dealers.
Moreover, the actual rationale of the decision was quite narrow, holding that restraints
between firms such as railroads that had received special privileges from the state were
unlawful regardless of the reasonableness of the price set. See Meese, supra note 56, at
43-46.
133 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (recognizing
Congress's "desire to promote competition through the protection of' small business even
if that promotion came at expense of efficiencies and higher prices for consumers).
134 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278 (1966); see also 15 U.S.C. § 18
(2006) (banning anticompetitive mergers); Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 381,403-13 (1980) (detailing this
era's hostility toward mergers that disadvantaged rivals by reducing costs of newly-created
firm).
135 Von's, 384 U.S. at 275 n.9; Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 316 n.28.
136 See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968) (treating contract's propensity to disadvantage smaller dealers by channeling distribution through larger, more efficient dealers as harmful result), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
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IV
THE HARVARD ScHOOL, UNITED SHoE, AND THE
TOTAL WELFARE STANDARD

Alcoa rejected both purchaser welfare and total welfare as the
animating values of section 2. However, Hand's producer welfare
vision of the Act has not fared well, either in academia or in the
courts. Most scholars reject Hand's account as an inappropriate interpretation of the Sherman Act, 137 and the Supreme Court has taken a
different approach as well.J3 8 Both the Court and most scholars have
opined that the Sherman Act pursues "consumer welfare" to the
exclusion of other values. At the same time, however, scholars disagree about the appropriate definition of "consumer welfare." Some
refer to purchaser welfare, that is, the welfare of purchasers in the
market dominated by the monopolist. 139 Others refer to total welfare,
that is, the welfare of all consumers, whether or not they are participants in the relevant market. 140 Moreover, proponents of the purchaser welfare standard attribute the total welfare standard to Robert
Bork and the Chicago School, with the effect-if not the intent-of
downplaying the extent and longevity of support for this approach. As
shown below, however, Bork and Chicago were latecomers to a total
welfare standard, a standard that the Harvard School of antitrust analysis began to embrace in the work of Edward Mason, Carl Kaysen,
and Donald Turner-over a decade before Bork. This work influenced the pivotal decision in United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., another challenge to United Shoe's monopoly. 141 For that case,
Kaysen, a student of Mason, served as a special law clerk assisting a
district judge in his efforts to evaluate a renewed challenge to conduct
by a monopolist that had escaped condemnation just three decades
earlier. The second United Shoe case created a safe harbor for "competition based on pure merit," without regard to whether such conduct enhanced the welfare of purchasers in the relevant market,
consistent with the safe harbor for "normal" conduct recognized
during the formative era.
137 See AREEDA & TuRNER, supra note 124, 'll 626b & n.14 (endorsing United Shoe
formulation over that employed in Alcoa); Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 1703 (opining
that legislative history suggesting concern for noneconomic values was "a sideshow"); infra
Section A {detailing Bork's criticism of Alcoa opinion); infra Section B (detailing criticism
of Alcoa by Kaysen, Mason, and Turner).
138 See infra Part V.B (detailing Supreme Court's acceptance of total welfare approach).
139 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
140 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
141 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd,
347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam).
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Robert Bark's (Tardy) Attack on Alcoa

Two decades after Alcoa, Robert Bork famously launched an
attack on Judge Hand's account of the normative foundations of antitrust law as part of a larger examination of the original meaning of
section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act. Bork performed an
exhaustive review of the Act's legislative history as well as the early
case law.l 42 Both sources, Bork said, pointed in the same direction:
The Sherman Act did not empower courts to pursue social and political values at the expense of purchasers. 143 Bork did not, however,
embrace a purchaser welfare standard, nor did any other members of
the Chicago School. Instead, his critique of Hand rested on his conclusion that Congress had meant courts to adopt antitrust standards that
maximized what Bork called "consumer want satisfaction." 144 In so
doing, Bork drew upon neoclassical price theory, both to help model
and explain business behavior and to supply the requisite normative
framework. 145 Thus, Bork equated "want satisfaction" with the welfare of all consumers or, in other words, society's total welfare (what
he also called the "maximization of wealth"), and not just those consumers who happened to purchase in the market where the defendant
did business. 146 There was, Bork said, no other conceivable value that
142 See Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 11-47 (examining legislative history);
Bork, Rule of Reason I, supra note 56, at 775, 781-829 (examining early case law).
143 See Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 8-14 (summarizing Hand's view as well
as Bork's basis for disagreement); id. at 26-31 (reaching this conclusion with respect to
section 2 in particular); Bork, Rule of Reason I, supra note 56, at 781-829 (examining early
case law); id. at 829-32 (arguing that "implicit in the approach of the main tradition" found
in early case law "is the policy of assisting the economy to maximize wealth").
144 See Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 7 ("My conclusion, drawn from the
evidence in the Congressional Record, is that Congress intended the courts to implement
(that is, take into account in the decision of cases) only that value we would today call
consumer want satisfaction."); Bork, Rule of Reason /, supra note 56, at 829 (defining
wealth maximization as "consumer want satisfaction"); id. at 830 ("[W]e can extrapolate
[from the early cases] the policy that necessarily underlies the decisions ... even though
that policy may never have been explicitly formulated in the judge's mind. The policy ... is
the maximization of wealth or consumer want satisfaction."); id. at 830-31 ("The disparity
[between mergers and naked cartels] is indeed provocative but, as analysis demonstrates, it
is far from anomalous .... The operative significance thus given to efficiency in the production and distribution of goods and services necessarily derives from a desire to increase the
wealth of the society.").
145 See BoRK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 107-10 (arguing that Williamson's
tradeoff model can illustrate all antitrust problems); see also id. at 116-17 (contending that
price theory is only methodology capable of informing rational antitrust policy); Richard
A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925, 932 (1979) ("The
Chicago School has largely prevailed with respect to its basic point: that the proper lens for
viewing antitrust problems is price theory.").
146 Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 7; see Robert H. Bork, The Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 AM. EcoN. REv. 242, 245 (1967) [hereinafter Bork, Goals of Antitrust]
(arguing that Sherman Act's "preference for competitive rather than monopolistic
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could explain the distinctions formative-era courts and members of
Congress had repeatedly drawn between naked cartels, on the one
hand, and various forms of productive integration, on the other. 147
Under this approach, a practice that created wealth on balance would
be lawful even if it injured the welfare of purchasers in the particular
market in question.14S

B.

Bork's (Not So Distant) Ancestors: Edward Mason, Carl
Kaysen, and the Reprise of United Shoe

Some scholars attribute the total welfare approach to Robert
Bork and the Chicago School (and only the Chicago School), with the
effect of minimizing the apparent support for such a standard within
the antitrust community at large. 149 Bork is certainly a strong supporter of the total welfare approach, having deployed several complementary arguments in its defense in four different works, starting in
1965.1 50 Still, Bork began this defense over a decade after antitrust
scholars in Cambridge, Massachusetts were embracing a total welfare
standard. Thus, academic support for the total welfare approach is far
more widespread and deeply rooted than its detractors might imagine.
Before Bork attended law school, Edward Mason was busy
founding the so-called "Harvard School" of antitrust policy. 151 Beginresource allocation is ... based upon a desire to maximize output as consumers value it"
and defining "consumer welfare" to require "minimizing restrictions of output and permitting efficiency, however gained, to have its way"); Bork, Rule of Reason /,supra note 56, at
829-30 (equating maximization of "consumer want satisfaction" with "maximization of
wealth").
147 See Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 14-26 (discussing statements by legislators describing policy behind Act as well as proposed rules of law); Bork, Rule of Reason I,
supra note 56, at 830 n.177 ("It seems difficult to imagine another value which would suggest greater toleration for mergers than for cartels since, aside from their efficiencyenhancing potential, mergers might seem less socially desirable.").
148 See Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 7 (defending total welfare standard); see
also BaRK, ANTITRusT PARADOX, supra note 2, at 107-15 (arguing that mergers that
create efficiencies are good for society at large).
149 See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 31, at 22 (treating Bork as single representative of
total welfare view); Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 31, at 192-96 (attributing this view to
Bork and other Chicagoans); Salop, supra note 3, at 329 n.68 (treating Bork as single representative of total welfare standard); cf. William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of
Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double
Helix, 2007 CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 42-43, 71 (noting that proponents of interventionist
enforcement often attribute contrary view to purportedly extreme Chicago School while
ignoring similar positions advanced by Harvard School).
150 See BaRK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 90-115 (arguing for total welfare
approach); Bork, Goals of Antitrust, supra note 146, at 245 (same); Bork, Legislative
Intent, supra note 2, at 7 (same); Bork, Rule of Reason I, supra note 56, at 829-31 (same).
151 See Posner, supra note 145, 928 n.8 (stating that position of Harvard School "is well
conveyed in the writings of Edward S. Mason"). There was, at the time Mason started
writing, no "Chicago School" of antitrust policy.
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ning in 1937, Mason authored a number of articles that developed a
workable competition approach to industrial organization and antitrust theory. 152 Adherents to "workable competition" rejected perfect
competition-the foundation of neoclassical price theory-as a reliable jJenchmark for evaluating trade practices, recognizing that certain departures from perfect competition could actually generate
more benefits than harms, despite resulting market power.l 53 The
classic example was economies of scale: In some industries technology
was such that only relatively large firms could realize available efficiencies, thereby inevitably producing a concentrated market structure conducive to market power and inconsistent with perfect
competition. 154 In language like that which Bork would employ nearly
two decades later, Mason opined that competition was not an end in
itself, but was instead desirable "for the results that are expected to
follow from it," namely the "efficient use of resources." 155 Working
with a grant from the Merrill Foundation, Mason created an interdisciplinary working group in 1950 charged with "formulat[ing] a standard
of workable competition." 156 The group included participants from
the Harvard Economics Department, Harvard Law School, and
MIT. 157 Two of the participants would co-author a leading monograph
152 See EdwardS. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34, 46 (1937)
[hereinafter Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics] ("[Some degree of] control is perfectly compatible with the existence of some degree of competition."); Edward S. Mason,
The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HARV. L. REv. 1265,
1266-71 & n.6 (1949) [hereinafter Mason, Current Status] (examining implications of workable competition model for various antitrust problems).
153 See Mason, Current Status, supra note 152, at 1266-67 ("From the point of view of
economic policy, competition is supposedly desirable, not as an end in itself, but for the
results that are expected to follow from it."). In addition to Mason's work, see, for
example, John M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. EcoN. REv.
241 (1940), which explains the shortcomings of perfect competition as a benchmark for
antitrust policy, and JoHN PERRY MILLER, UNFAIR CoMPETITION 404-22 (1940), which
calls for policies that further workable competition. See also Alan J. Meese, Monopolization, Exclusion and the Theory of the Firm, 89 MINN. L. REv. 743, 772-93 (2005)
(describing development of workable competition school, including role of Harvard
scholars).
154 See EDWARDS. MAsON, Workable Competition Versus Workable Monopoly, in Eco.
NOMIC CoNCENTRATION AND TilE MoNOPOLY PRoBLEM 382, 387-88 (1957) (arguing that
when deciding what constitutes permissible versus impermissible monopolistic behavior,
courts should take into account how that behavior affects "the organization and administration of economic resources"); see also JoE S. BAIN, PRICING, DISTRIBUTION, AND
EMPLOYMENT 112 (rev. ed. 1953) (arguing that "[i]n most industries a very small firm is
quite inefficient" in light of unrealized economies of scale).
155 See Mason, Current Status, supra note 152, at 1266-67.
156 See Nine Professors Named for Study of Monopoly Problems, CHRISTIAN Sci.
MoNITOR, July 10, 1950, at 13 (describing Mason's launch of five-year study).
157 See Edward S. Mason, Preface to CARL KA YSEN & DoNALD F. TuRNER, ANTITRUST
Poucv, at xi, xix n.ll (1959) (describing group and its membership).
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on the economics of antitrust policy, with a preface by Mason
describing the book as a manifestation of the working group's
views. 158 Another authored leading texts in price theory and industrial
organization. 159
Like Bork would do more than fifteen years later, Mason argued
in 1949 that Alcoa's holding swept too far. The decision, Mason said,
threatened to ban ordinary competitive tactics like the expansion of
productive capacity to meet demand and the concomitant realization
of economies of scale. 16o Other scholars would echo Mason's concerns.l61 None of these scholars invoked or endorsed a purchaser welfare standard.
Nonetheless, buoyed by its success in Alcoa, the United States
had challenged another monopolist, the United Shoe Machinery
Corporation, in the District of Massachusetts. In so doing, the government focused on conduct that post-dated its unsuccessful attack on the
company three decades earlier. 162 Invoking Alcoa, the United States
sought to condemn United Shoe on the grounds that its consistent
embrace of new opportunities was indicative of an intent to monopolize.163 In addition, the government challenged a wide variety of the
company's practices, including purely internal activities such as the
introduction of new machines in response to competitive challenges,
as well as aggressive research, development, and patenting. 164
Perplexed by what he termed the government's "scattershot
case," 165 Judge Wyzanski sought help from, literally, the Harvard
School of antitrust analysis. He contacted Mason, then the Dean of
158 ld. at xix (describing influence of working group discussions on authors' conclusions
and contending that monograph was result of joint effort by members of study group).
159 See Joe S. Bain, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1959) [hereinafter BAIN, INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION); JOE S. BAIN, PRICE THEORY {1952).
160 See Mason, Current Status, supra note 152, at 1273 ("Although [the Alcoa] decision
probably broke new legal ground, it is from an economist's point of view, marred by what
is at best some very dubious economics .... [T]he evidence concerning intent to exclude
others is difficult to distinguish from ordinary, intelligent competitive action."); id. at 1275
("[I)t would appear extremely difficult to distinguish between a progressive embracing 'of
each new opportunity' and what would ordinarily be considered desirable competitive
performance.").
161 See, e.g., KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 157, at 107 (criticizing Alcoa's general
rule).
162 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text {describing facts of prior case).
163 See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 329 (D. Mass.
1953), affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam) ("United has continuously sought to anticipate all demands of the shoe industry for improved or new machinery, and, where such
demand seems to invite competition, to forestall such competition by manufacturing and
distributing such machinery.").
164 See id. at 329-31 (recounting government's allegations).
165 /d. at 314 {chiding government for "unforgivably unselective tactics").
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Harvard's Public Policy School, in search of a special law clerk to
assist in the court's analysis of the parties' contentions. 166 Mason suggested that Judge Wyzanski appoint Carl Kaysen, then a graduate student in the Harvard Economics Department and a participant in
Mason's working group. 167 Judge Wyzanski obliged and hired Kaysen,
whom he tasked with analyzing the voluminous record that had been
amassed in the case. 168 Kaysen prepared a lengthy report, which he
subsequently published, with few changes, as his doctoral thesis.1 69
While he did not discuss the case in the working group, he reported
that the general principles animating the group influenced his
recommendations. 17o
Relying heavily on Kaysen's report, Judge Wyzanski first found
that United Shoe possessed a monopoly share (75%) of the shoe
machinery market. 171 He then found that various barriers to entry
made it unlikely that rivals would undermine that share anytime soon.
These barriers included the excellent quality of United's machines, its
reputation, and the high quality of its aftermarket service.l72 The barriers also included United's policy of leasing its machines and refusing
to sell them outright, as well as the adoption of so-called "full capacity
clause[s]." 173 These clauses required lessees to use machines they had
leased from United at full capacity before turning to machines manufactured by rivals. Finally, Judge Wyzanski invoked United's policy of
requiring lessees to use its repair service as a condition of the lease, a
service United would not provide to other shoe machinery manufacturers.174 This policy, he said, deprived the marketplace of "large scale
independent repair companies," thereby creating a "stumbling block"
166 See Carl Kaysen, In Memoriam: Charles E. Wyzanksi, 100 HARV. L. REv. 713, 713
(1987) (recounting events that led to Kaysen's appointment as special law clerk).
167 See CARL KAYSEN, UNITED STATES v. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CoRPORATION.
AN EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF AN ANTI-TRUST CAsE viii (1956) (describing Kaysen's participation in Mason's working group).
168 Kaysen, supra note 166, at 713-14.
169 KAYSEN, supra note 167, at vii.
170 /d. at viii.
171 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 343 (D. Mass. 1953),
affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam).
172 Id. at 344 ("To combat United's market control, a competitor must be prepared with
knowledge of shoemaking, engineering skill, capacity to invent around patents, and financial resources sufficient to bear the expense of long developmental and experimental
processes."); see also supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (explaining that production
of high-quality products at low prices will exclude less efficient rivals).
173 United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 320, 324-25 (describing such clauses and their entrydeterring effects).
174 See id. at 344 ("The three principal sources of United's power have been the original
constitution of the company, the superiority of United's products and services, and the
leasing system. The first two of these are plainly beyond reproach." (emphasis added)).
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for those firms that wished to compete with United, because they
could not participate in the market without entering at two levelsP5
Under a purchaser welfare approach, Judge Wyzanski would then
have asked whether United Shoe's various tactics, alone or in tandem,
reduced the welfare of purchasers in the relevant market. If a tactic
excluded rivals but produced no benefits, the answer would be simple:
The court would ban the arrangement. If, on the other hand, a tactic
both excluded rivals and produced benefits, the court would ask
whether those benefits counteracted the impact of any market power
effects on purchasers and thus enhanced, or at least did not reduce,
the welfare of purchasers.
Judge Wyzanski did nothing of the sort. Instead, after a careful
analysis of existing precedent, he announced and applied a standard
identical to that suggested by Kaysen's report. 176 In particular, Judge
Wyzanski announced a safe harbor for what he called "competition
based on pure merit." 177 Such conduct included "the use of accessible
resources, the process of invention and innovation, and the employment of those techniques of employment, financing, production, and
distribution, which a competitive society must foster." 178 Judge
Wyzanski went on to include activities such as: "efficient design and
improvement of machines," "prompt and knowledgeable service,"
"research," refusal to share the fruits of that research, and "economies
of scale. " 179 Each of these was an example of unilateral conduct and
thus could not implicate section 1 of the Sherman Act, which only
reaches concerted action. 180 As for liability under section 2, Judge
Wyzanski recognized that the tactics that he accepted as "competition
on pure merit" could make entry by competitors difficult and thus
could create or fortify a monopoly; indeed, he found that they had
done so in the case at hand.l 81 Nonetheless, he said, these practices
were "beyond reproach" and constituted the "superior skill, foresight,
and industry" that were "the inevitable consequences of ability, nat/d. at 325.
See Meese, supra note 153, at 801 nn.247-48 (collecting various authorities demonstrating influence of Kaysen's report on Judge Wyzanski's opinion).
177 United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 345.
178 /d. at 344-45.
179 /d.; see id. at 333 (finding that United had "never offered to license all, or its principal, shoe machinery patents").
180 See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 759, 763, 767-78
(1984) (holding unilateral conduct to be beyond reach of section 1).
181 See United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 344 ("United's control does not rest solely on its
original constitution, its ability, its research, or its economies of scale." (emphasis added));
see also HovENKAMP, supra note 88, at 553 ("Nothing is a more effective barrier to entry
than a firm's capacity to produce a high quality product at a low price, or to provide
improved service to its customers.").
175
176
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ural forces, or law." 182 In short, the court declined to condemn conduct that helped create and fortify a monopoly without making any
effort to ascertain the net impact of such conduct on purchasers.
United Shoe, of course, had done more than just engage in the
sort of unilateral competition on the merits that Judge Wyzanski
declined to condemn. It had also entered various contracts with customers that, as Judge Wyzanski found, made entry by rivals more difficult.l83 Moreover, extant economic theory had no benign explanation
for such practices; economists interpreted them as the use of
monopoly power to foreclose rivals from competitive opportunities. 184
As such, these agreements were incompatible with workable competition and thus the very antithesis of competition on the merits as Judge
Wyzanski defined it. 185 Even though such conduct might be "honestly
industrial," in the sense that non-monopolists might employ such tactics, Judge Wyzanski nonetheless declared it to be unlawful because it
excluded rivals without creating any offsetting benefits. 186
Judge Wyzanski, it should be noted, did not expressly depart from
Alcoa, but instead purported to follow that decision, which was, after
all, binding on him. 187 He read the decision as banning the achievement or maintenance of monopoly by "manoeuvres" that, while "honestly industrial," were "not economically inevitable, but were rather
the result of the firm's free choice of business policies." 188 At the same
time, he claimed to find within Alcoa a safe harbor for firms that had
achieved a monopoly solely as the result of "superior skill, superior
products, natural advantages, (including accessibility to raw materials
or markets), economic or technological efficiency, (including scientific
research), low margins of profit maintained permanently and without
discrimination, or licenses conferred by, and used within, the limits of
law, (including patents on one's own inventions, or franchises granted
182 See United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 344 (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945)); see also KAYSEN, supra note 167, at 16-19 (arguing
that monopoly maintained by means of economies of scale is unobjectionable).
183 See United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 344 ("But United's control does not rest solely on
its original constitution, its ability, its research, or its economies of scale. There are other
barriers to competition, and these barriers were erected by United's own business
policies.").
184 See Meese, supra note 153, at 771-93 (explaining how economic theory of period
treated various nonstandard agreements as coercive efforts to protect or extend monopoly
power); see a/so BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 159, 330-31 (concluding
that nonstandard contracts such as tying and exclusive dealing agreements are coercive
efforts by manufacturers to maintain or extend their power).
185 See Meese, supra note 153, at 793-812 (describing workable competition paradigm's
influence on section 2 doctrine).
186 United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 341-43.
187 See id. at 341-43 (invoking and purporting to follow Alcoa).
188 /d. at 341.
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directly to the enterprise by a public authority)." 189 He did not cite
any particular portion of Alcoa to support this claim or explain the
difference between expanding output-the conscious business policy
that doomed Alcoa-and enforcing a patent or realizing economies of
scale-both of which he claimed to be perfectly lawful under the
Alcoa formulation. In so doing, Judge Wyzanski took a page from a
then-recent Supreme Court decision, which had endorsed Alcoa while
at the same time claiming that the decision rested on a finding that
Alcoa had engaged in "unlawful" tactics. 190 Despite this creative
effort at reconciliation, Judge Wyzanski had plainly departed from
Hand's rationale_191
C.

Harvard Touts United Shoe (and Total Welfare)

Antitrust scholars from the Harvard School, who had criticized
Alcoa, endorsed Judge Wyzanski's opinion and approach in United
Shoe, including the result that monopoly obtained or maintained by
"competitive merit" was beyond reproach. 192 Indeed, one might say
that the decision was a paradigmatic exemplar of the Harvard School
approach to antitrust regulation generally. Just five years after the
decision, Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner, the former an MIT economist and the latter an economist at Harvard Law School, published
their definitive text Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis .193 A preface to the book by Edward Mason described the tome
as the fruit of the Harvard-centered study group that he had formed
less than a decade earlier. 194 The first and third chapters outlined the
/d. at 342.
See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 786 (1946) (characterizing
Alcoa as resting upon finding that "there was a use of various unlawful means to establish
or maintain the monopoly"). In fact, Judge Hand found no such independently "unlawful
means" but instead held that the otherwise lawful and normal conduct nonetheless violated
section 2. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945).
191 See LAWRENCE A. SuLLIVAN, HANDBOOK oF THE LAw oF ANTITRUST 95-99 (1977)
(concluding that holding of United Shoe revised Alcoa and correctly stated law of monopolization); Stanley D. Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 3-4
(1980) (pointing out that United Shoe opinion departed from Alcoa in manner favorable to
monopolists).
192 KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 157, at 22, 44, 268 (approving approach in United
Shoe and stating that "the Sherman Act has been interpreted-and properly, we think-to
leave room for legal monopolies, that is, for monopolies acquired solely by competitive
merit" (emphasis added)).
193 KA YSEN & TURNER, supra note 157.
194 See Mason, supra note 157, at xix ("[T]he study is, in an important sense, the product
of the discussion of a group of lawyers and economists extending over several years. The
authors would be the first to admit that the contribution of the group to the formulation of
the ideas here presented has been large.").
189

190
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overarching framework the authors would employ to evaluate various
business practices and the appropriate antitrust policy toward each.1 95
According to the authors, antitrust law should interdict what they
called an "unreasonable degree of market power." 196 Under a purchaser welfare balancing test, antitrust law might determine "reasonableness" by asking whether the restraint or other challenged practice
resulted in higher prices than would obtain without the practice. 197
However, Kaysen and Turner did not mention the welfare of purchasers; they instead chose a different approach to determining reasonableness, one derived from neoclassical price theory's workable
competition model, which had informed Mason's own work for two
decades.l 98 That is, following earlier work by Mason, the authors
admonished courts and the enforcement agencies to treat as "reasonable" any market power that was necessary to "maintain[] desirable
levels of economic performance. " 199 Desirable performance, in turn,
was defined as an efficient allocation of productive resources. 200 Thus,
the authors proposed a standard whereby the law would interdict significant amounts of market power unless possession of such power
was necessary to realize nontrivial efficiencies. 201 For instance, these
See KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 157, at 3-23.
/d. at 44-45 (describing primary goal of antitrust policy as eliminating "undue
market power to the extent consistent with maintaining desirable levels of economic performance"); see also id. at 77-79 (describing elimination of "unreasonable market power"
as authors' primary goal).
197 See, e.g., Salop, supra note 3, at 313-14, 330-32.
198 See Clark, supra note 153 (discussing workable competition model). I do not mean to
suggest that Professors Kaysen and Turner endorsed each policy prescription that could be
attributed to some version of workable competition. On the contrary, the authors expressly
distanced themselves from particular versions of workable competition theory. KA YSEN &
TuRNER, supra note 157, at 81-82. However, they expressly embraced that version of
workable competition which "identifies markets as workably competitive when they
cannot be made more so, consistent with the requirements of efficiency and the recognition
of the realities of consumer preference and geography." See id. at 81; see also BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 159, at 13-18 (describing and endorsing workable competition as guide to public policy).
199 See KA YSEN & TuRNER, supra note 157, at 44-45 ("[W]e are suggesting that the
primary goal of antitrust policy be the limitation of undue market power to the extent
consistent with maintaining desirable levels of economic performance."); see also MASON,
supra note 154, at 387 (articulating similar standard for "permissible power").
200 KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 157, at 11-12. The authors identified four attributes
of economic performance: efficiency, progressiveness, stability in output and employment,
and an equitable distribution of income. They concluded, however, that antitrust policy
was not an appropriate vehicle for stabilizing the economy or assuring an equitable distribution of income. See id. at 11-12. Nineteen years later, Bork would agree without citing
Kaysen and Turner. See BoRK, ANTITRusT PARADox, supra note 2, at 110-12 (opining
that courts should not use antitrust to affect distribution of income).
201 See KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 157, at 78 ("Market power resting on certain
bases we consider 'reasonable,' because we think it either undesirable or impossible to
eliminate them .... [Market power resulting from economies of scale] could be reduced
195
196
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scholars concluded that a merger that conferred market power on the
merging parties (and thus raised prices) should nonetheless survive
antitrust scrutiny so long as it produced significant efficiencies that
could not be achieved by other means. 202 They also concluded that
antitrust law should not condemn product differentiation, even though
such conduct would naturally lead to market power and higher
prices. 203 Moreover, these scholars and others advocated breaking up
firms that possessed significant market power, unless such action
would prevent the realization of significant efficiencies. 204 Finally,
these authors argued that courts should not condemn monopolies
achieved solely as a result of economies of scale and similar competition on the merits. 205 Attacking such market power would result in
"producing at higher costs in inefficiently small units"-a price the
authors "d[id] not desire to pay." 206 Not surprisingly, then, they and
other members of the Harvard School endorsed the standard
announced in United Shoe as an appropriate implementation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.zo7
This approach was emphatically not a purchaser welfare balancing test or otherwise an effort to maximize the welfare of purchasers. Indeed, when defining the content of "desirable economic
results," the authors rejected "an equitable distribution of income" as
a variable antitrust law could or should influence. 208 Thus, like the test
only at the cost of producing at higher costs in inefficiently small units; this price we do not
desire to pay.").
202 /d. at 133-34. This result, of course, followed the more general principle that society
should tolerate market power that is necessary to realize efficiencies. See, e.g., MASON,
supra note 154, at 387.
203 KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 157, at 77-78; see also Mason, Monopoly in Law and
Economics, supra note 152, at 48 (noting that law does not condemn successful differentiation of product even though it may entrench monopoly power); BAIN, supra note 154, at
. 373-74 (noting that product differentiation in oligopolistic markets may lead to less than
optimum production).
204 See, e.g., KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 157, at 113; MILLER, supra note 153, at
411-12 {advocating breaking up firms "to [the] extent ... feasible without interfering with
the attainment of the optimum scale of plant and rate of operation"); MAsON, supra note
154, at 387 {"There is no reason, however, to tolerate positions of market power that can
be lessened by appropriate antitrust action unless it can be shown that this lessening substantially interferes with the job to be done [by the firm]." (emphasis added)).
205 KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 157, at 78.
206 /d.
207 See, e.g., id. at 268 (suggesting ..justifications" for market power that "closely
resemble those suggested by Judge Wyzanski in United Shoe"); MASON, supra note 154, at
387-88 (arguing that courts should tolerate market power where concentration resulting in
such power is dictated by economies of scale); JoEL B. DIRLAM & ALFRED E. KAHN, FAIR
CoMPETITION: THE LAw AND EcoNOMICS oF ANTITRuST PouCY 62-63 (1954) (same);
MILLER, supra note 153, at 411 (same).
208 KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 157, at 11-12.

June 2010]

DEBUNKING THE PURCHASER WELFARE ACCOUNT

701

articulated by Judge Wyzanski, the standard endorsed by these
scholars did not incorporate any examination of the actual or predicted impact of a monopolist's conduct upon purchasers in the relevant market. 209 Instead, (perhaps) unlike formative-era judges, the
Harvard School plainly contemplated that, in some cases, firms would
achieve or maintain market power or even a monopoly by realizing
economies of scale or other efficiencies. They did not assert that
monopolists would pass such savings on to purchasers in the relevant
market, but instead endorsed such conduct because it would enhance
society's overall welfare by ensuring the best possible arrangement of
productive resources. 210 They even anticipated a "second best" objection to their approach, arguing that antitrust policy should adopt a
"Pigovian assumption" that "it is desirable to make as close an
approach to the conditions of economic efficiency in as many sectors
of economy as possible." 211 The authors' invocation of Pigou only
made sense within a total welfare framework. 212 Kaysen and Turner
thus implicitly applied the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion so often

209 See id. at 11-12, 44-45 (suggesting that "primary goal of antitrust policy" should be
"limitation of undue market power to the extent consistent with maintaining desirable
levels of economic performance"); id. at 77-79 (asserting that antitrust policy should eliminate only unreasonable market power); id. at 45 (arguing that antitrust policy should tolerate market power that is necessary to achieve "efficiency and progressiveness").
210 See id. at 12 ("Efficiency is ideally a distributive or relational concept, which
embraces the whole economy. Essentially [efficiency] is a state in which no rearrangement
of outputs among products and no redistribution of inputs among firms could increase
consumer satisfaction."). The term "consumer satisfaction," read in light of the authors'
reference to efficiency in "the whole economy" plainly refers to what Robert Bork called
"consumer want satisfaction," that is, the aggregate welfare of all consumers, whether or
not they purchased the monopolist's product. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying
text; see also BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION supra note 159, at 24 (stating that general
equilibrium theory, "is our primary source of standards as to what constitutes desirable
performance by firms and industries"); MILLER, supra note 153, at 360 (employing similar
definition of efficiency relevant to competition policy).
211 See KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 157, at 12 & n.11. Pigou pioneered the theory of
regulating externalities to prevent market failure, thereby maximizing the "national dividend," or total welfare. See A.C. PIGou, THE EcoNOMICS OF WELFARE 31-42 (1932)
(equating "national dividend" with "economic welfare"); id. at 127-30 (describing plan of
book as determining extent to which "free play of self interest" will maximize "national
dividend"); id. at 172-203 (examining role of externalities in creating market failure and
possible remedies).
212 See Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A
Comment, 11 J.L. & EcoN. 67, 69-71 (1968) (arguing that antitrust regulation can be
explained as effort to replicate allocation of resources that would occur in absence of bargaining costs, thereby maximizing total welfare).
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employed by economists as a guide to public policy. 213 Turner would
use the same normative benchmark in subsequent work. 214
The Supreme Court affirmed Judge Wyzanski's decision unanimously.215 Moreover, the distinction between competition on the
merits and unnatural exclusion has served as the backbone for much
section 2 doctrine ever since. In United States v. Grinnell Corp., for
instance, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision by Judge Wyzanski
that condemned the Grinnell Corporation for maintenance of its
monopoly. 216 In so doing, the Court announced that section 2 did not
forbid a monopoly obtained or maintained by means of "superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident."2 17 Instead, the
Court-without mentioning purchaser welfare or any synonym
thereof-condemned the firm because it had achieved and maintained
its monopoly position by means of mergers with rivals and long-term
leases that the Court characterized as "coercive." 218
Proponents of a purchaser welfare approach to section 2 regularly
assert that support for the total welfare standard originated with the
Chicago School and is still confined to that subset of antitrust scholars
and jurists. 219 By framing support for the total welfare standard in this
way, proponents of purchaser welfare minimize the apparent support
for the total welfare standard while at the same time offering their
own approach as the mainstream view long-embraced by the Supreme
Court. This Part has offered an entirely different account of the origins of the total welfare school, an approach that undermines the story
told by proponents of the purchaser welfare standard. As it turns out,
before there was a recognized Chicago School of antitrust analysis, the
so-called Harvard School was generating doctrinal prescriptions premised upon a normative total welfare account of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. These prescriptions influenced the seminal United Shoe
decision and, ironically, presaged the Chicago School's own commitment to a total welfare standard. Support for the total welfare standard is more widespread and deeply rooted than generally supposed.
213 See RICHARD A. PosNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS oF LAw 12-15 (1986) (defining
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion and discussing relationship between Kaldor-Hicks and
Pareto superiority criteria).
21 4 See Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1207, 1208-09 (1969) (assuming that appropriate goal of economic
policy is to "maximize aggregate economic wealth" and endorsing view that economies of
scale should justify high concentration).
215 United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam).
216 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
217 /d. at 571.
218 /d. at 578.
219 See supra note 149 (collecting authorities attributing this view primarily to Bork).
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By 1965, the Chicago and Harvard Schools had embraced the
total welfare normative framework to govern section 2's regulation of
monopolists' conduct. For instance, both schools agreed that a socalled efficient monopolist did not offend section 2, without regard to
whether the monopoly reduced the welfare of purchasers in the relevant market. Moreover, United Shoe and its progeny embraced this
approach, which it implemented in light of the economic theory of the
time. Accordingly, competition on the merits was lawful per se, while
agreements that tended to exclude rivals were deemed coercive exercises of monopoly power without offsetting benefits and thus, if
entered into by a monopolist, were unlawful per se.
This apparent agreement on normative premises may seem surprising to some. After all, scholars have often portrayed Harvard and
Chicago as competing schools of thought offering radically different
prescriptions for antitrust doctrine.220 Indeed, there is no doubt that
the two schools have often advocated vastly different legal rules governing various types of conduct.221 Nonetheless, the evidence adduced
thus far suggests that these differences do not reflect any normative
disagreement about what effects matter for antitrust purposes, at least
under section 2 of the Sherman Act. On the contrary, as suggested
elsewhere, these differences would seem to be purely descriptive; they
result from different economic appraisals of the impact of the practices in question. 222 In any event, as explained below, Harvard continued to embrace the total welfare account of section 2 doctrine-so
often associated with the Chicago School-well into the 1980s and
1990s.
A.

Harvard Reiterates Its Support for Total Welfare

This collective embrace of the total welfare standard was no
passing fad or anomaly. During the 1970s, the Harvard School reiterated and systematized the approach to section 2 litigation that Judge
Wyzanski articulated in the United Shoe decision and that Kaysen and
Turner endorsed in their 1959 treatise. For instance, in 1975,
Professors Turner and Areeda published their blockbuster article on
220 MichaelS. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics,
74 N.C. L. REv. 219, 226-28 (1995) (characterizing Harvard and Chicago as competing
schools of antitrust thought); Posner, supra note 145, at 925-33 (arguing that "there was a
time" when Harvard and Chicago were distinct but that those distinctions have "greatly
diminished").
221 See Posner, supra note 145, at 925-33 (describing these differences).
222 See id.
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predatory pricing, which embraced the safe harbor for competition on
the merits. 223 Areeda had been a student at Harvard Law School
while Mason's working group was active, and Kingman Brewster,
Harvard's antitrust authority at the time, was a member of the
group. 224 The Areeda-Turner article sought to articulate the standards
courts should employ to examine predatory pricing by monopolists
and firms allegedly seeking monopoly power. The authors began with
the assumption that competition on the merits was lawful, even if it
injured or dispatched rival firms and led to higher purchaser prices. 225
They also concluded that above-cost pricing was always competition
on the merits and thus lawful per se. 226 The authors recognized that
such a safe harbor could in some cases reduce the welfare of purchasers, by allowing monopolists to deter or defeat entry by lessefficient rivals and thus maintain monopoly prices. 227 Nonetheless,
they adhered to their safe harbor proposal, in part because such high
prices were the natural reward that drove firms to obtain a monopoly
by innovating and realizing productive efficiencies in the first place:
Moreover, a monopolist whose power was legitimately acquired by
patents cannot be denied monopoly profits without subverting the
purpose of the patent laws. Similarly, denying monopoly profits to
those whose power was obtained by superior skill, foresight, and
industry could eliminate the primary incentive to develop such competitive skill. Finally, price restrictions would have perverse effects
on the efficiency and innovation aspects of a monopolist's on-going
performance by eliminating the reward.22s
223 See Philip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697 {1975). William Kovacic has
argued that this article "has a strong claim to be the most influential law review article ever
written on an antitrust topic." Kovacic, supra note 149, at 46. I do not disagree with this
assessment. At the same time, it should be noted that the safe harbor for above-cost
pricing and competition on the merits endorsed by this 1975 article can trace its origins to
Judge Wyzanski's United Shoe decision more than two decades earlier and the Harvard
School that influenced him.
224 Mason, supra note 157, at xix.
225 See Areeda & Turner, supra note 223, at 697 ("A firm which drives out or excludes
rivals by selling at unremunerative prices is not competing on the merits, but engaging in
behavior that may properly be called predatory.").
226 /d. at 706 ("Exclusion by charging prices equal to average cost is also competition on
the merits-only those potential entrants who cannot survive at the efficiency-related price
are kept out .... [M]ore-or-less permanently 'low' prices are ... not an abuse of power or
exclusionary behavior for the purposes of Section two .... " (footnotes omitted)); id. at 709
("[W]e conclude that a price at or above average cost should be demed [sic] non-predatory, and not in law exclusionary, whether permanent or not.").
227 See id. at 705-06 (recognizing that so-called above-cost "limit pric[ing)" by incumbent monopolist can deter entry and thereby help incumbent sustain monopoly prices).
228 /d. at 707.
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Here again, the authors concluded that the welfare of purchasers in a
particular market should yield to the overall welfare of society. As
one scholar has explained, this approach to predatory pricing was
indistinguishable from that taken by the Chicago School.229
Three years later, Turner and Areeda would publish the early
volumes of their extremely influential treatise on antitrust law. There
they repeated their assertion that section 2 should not reach competition on the merits, and they offered the most comprehensive definition to date of that term, a definition consistent with that offered by
Carl Kaysen and Judge Wyzanski more than two decades earlier. 230
After opining that section 2 should forbid "exclusionary" conduct by a
monopolist, they went on to try and define it:
[T]he first step in defining "exclusionary" conduct is to state what it
clearly is not. Our concern about monopoly and the opportunities of
rivals must not be allowed to obscure the objective of antitrust law
which seeks to protect the process of competition on the merits and
the economic results associated with workable competition. Accordingly, non-exploitative pricing, higher output, improved product
quality, energetic market penetration, successful research and
development, cost-reducing innovations, and the like are welcomed
by the Sherman Act and are not therefore to be considered "exclusionary" for § 2 purposes even if monopoly results. We attempt no
further catalogue of desirable behavior at this point, but rest for the
moment on the desirability of behavior constituting competition on
the merits-the superior skill, foresight, and industry of which Judge
Hand spoke. Antitrust law should not base the imposition of sanctions on the very conduct it would encourage. Behavior that is no
more restrictive of rivals' opportunities than is reasonably necessary
to effect competition on the merits is and should be approved by
Sherman Act § 2. Such behavior is, after all, indispensable if the
antitrust laws are to achieve their objective. Thus, "exclusionary"
comprehends at the most the behavior that not only (1) tends to
impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily
restrictive way.23l
229 See Kovacic, supra note 149, at 43-71 (showing that Harvard approach to predatory
pricing law, private actions, and refusals to deal mirrored that advocated by Chicago
School and vice versa). It should be noted that, despite its title, Professor Kovacic's article
deals only with unilateral conduct by monopolists and not all dominant firm conduct.
Moreover, the article does not examine section 2's normative premise, the underlying normative agreement between Harvard and Chicago, the Harvard School origin of the total
welfare standard, nor the United Shoe decision or the origins of the term "competition on
the merits."
230 See supra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
231 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 124, 'll 626b (emphasis added). Despite this passage's reference to "non-exploitative pricing," the authors subsequently took the position
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Areeda and Turner also expressly endorsed the rationale and
result of the United Shoe decision. 232 The authors endorsed the economic results associated with workable competition and recognized
that competition on the merits could lead to and help maintain a
monopoly, to the detriment of purchasers, but nonetheless adhered to
such a safe harbor because of the welfare consequences over the long
term. To this end, they expressly opined that "exploitative" monopolistic pricing should not violate section 2 of the Sherman Act.233 Other
Harvard School scholars reached the same result.234
Moreover, buried in this paragraph and subsequent pages is a
subtle expansion of the sort of conduct the Harvard School thought
beyond the reach of section 2. Recall that United Shoe had drawn a
distinction between "competition based on pure merit," on the one
hand, and so-called "conscious business policies," on the other. 235
Agreements made by monopolists that disadvantaged rivals were, of
course, "conscious policies" and thus unlawful under this standard. 236
Areeda and Turner employed a different taxonomy, however, distinguishing between conduct deemed "exclusionary" from that which
was lawful. There is no reference to "conscious business policies."
Moreover, while the authors treated competition on the merits as
lawful per se, this does not exhaust the category of conduct that the
authors treat as "non-exclusionary" and thus lawful. This category
included not only (unilateral) competition on the merits, but also conduct that "is reasonably necessary to effect competition on the merits,"
or to "further" competition on the merits, even if such conduct
impaired the opportunities of rivals. 237 Conduct necessary to "effect"
competition on the merits could include exclusive dealing agreements
and other nonstandard contracts-what Judge Wyzanski would have
called unlawful "conscious business policies"-so long as the conduct
that even "exploitative" monopolistic pricing should not violate section 2 of the Sherman
Act. /d. 'li 710.
232 Id. 'JI 626b n.14.
233 /d. 'li 710.
234 See SuLLIVAN, supra note 191, at 95-99 (concluding that United Shoe revised Alcoa
and correctly stated law of monopolization). Sullivan graduated from Harvard Law School
in 1951, one year after Mason founded his working group and the same year that Phillip
Areeda entered Harvard. Sullivan's monograph lists several Harvard School industrial
organization texts as suggested reading. /d. at 15-17.
235 See supra notes 177-90 and accompanying text (outlining Judge Wyzanski's reasoning in United Shoe).
236 See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text (noting that agreements with customers, for example, that erect barriers to entry without benign explanation fail "competition on the merits" standard).
237 AREEDA & TuRNER, supra note 124, 'li 626b (emphasis added).
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produced benefits and was no broader than necessary to achieve those
benefits. 238
Despite their praise of United Shoe, Professors Areeda and
Turner endorsed a somewhat less intrusive scope for section 2 than
Judge Wyzanski had announced. This change did not reflect an adjustment of the normative standard that governed section 2 analysis, but
instead accommodated changes in positive economic theory that
undermined the Harvard School's previous hostility toward nonstandard contracts. 23 9 Whereas the old Harvard School believed that such
contracts could never produce benefits, recent developments in economic theory-particularly those hailing from the Chicago Schoolhad caused Harvard to reconsider its previous position. The most
famous examples, of course, were the arguments by Lester Telser and
Robert Bork that minimum resale price maintenance (Telser) 240 and
exclusive territories (Bork) 241 could overcome the sort of market
failure that reliance upon an unbridled market could produce. In fact,
these arguments led Professor Turner, just before publication of the
1978 treatise, to reverse his earlier position that exclusive territories
should be unlawful per se. 242 Moreover, as early as 1974, Professor
Areeda had opined that exclusive dealing contracts could produce
cognizable benefits by, for instance, promoting special selling efforts
by individual dealers.Z43 Given these developments, Professors
238 See id. (defining exclusionary conduct as more restrictive than necessary to "effect
competition on the merits").
239 See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text (documenting early Harvard School's
desire to protect "ordinary" competitive actions); Meese, supra note 153, at 812-41
(describing rise of transaction cost economics and its influence on monopolization
doctrine).
240 See, e.g., Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. &
EcoN. 86 (1960) (discussing resale price maintenance agreements and benefits of such nonstandard contracts).
241 See Bork, Rule of Reason II, supra note 73, at 430-38 (demonstrating how exclusive
territories can induce dealers to make optimal investments in promotion by preventing free
riding).
242 Compare Brief for Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 34-38, Cont'l
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (No. 76-15), 1977 WL 189274 (arguing
that courts should analyze nonprice vertical restraints under rule of reason), with Donald
F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and
Refusals To Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655, 699 (1962) (arguing that vertically-adopted exclusive territories should be unlawful per se ).
243 PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXTS, CASES <j[ 561 (2d ed.
1974). Scholars have subsequently questioned this assertion, while at the same time identifying other benefits of exclusive dealing contracts. See Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive
Dealing, 25 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 6 (1982) (arguing that exclusive dealing contracts create contractual property rights that ensure that manufacturers capture benefits of promotional
expenditures). Moreover, even before Professor Areeda's casebook, other scholars had
identified cognizable benefits that such agreements might produce. See Bork, Rule of
Reason II, supra note 73, at 398-402 (explaining how railroad could induce necessary
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Areeda and Turner naturally recognized the possibility that conduct
once deemed unlawful per se-exclusive dealing by monopolists, for
instance-should now be analyzed under a more forgiving standard.244 There were parallel developments in the courts and the
enforcement agencies. 245

B.

The Supreme Court Follows Harvard (and Chicago!)

The Harvard School's pronouncements did not fall on deaf ears.
Indeed, as some have noted, the Harvard School has exercised particular influence over the Supreme Court's antitrust doctrine, as evi~
denced by the Court's numerous favorable citations of Professor
Areeda's work. 246 As Justice Breyer once put it, Supreme Court advocates would rather cite two paragraphs of Professor Areeda's treatise
than the holdings of four courts of appeals and the opinions of three
Supreme Court justices.247
Section 2 doctrine is no exception. Just over a decade after
Professors Turner and Areeda published the early volumes of their
treatise, the Supreme Court took up Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Co. 248 There the Court reviewed a jury's conclusion
that an admitted monopolist had employed unlawful tactics-notably
a refusal to continue in a joint venture-to maintain its monopoly
position. The Court examined the lower court's jury instructions that
distinguished between a monopoly that was "legitimately gained" and
that obtained or maintained by means of exclusionary conduct. 249 This
distinction was consistent with that endorsed by the Areeda-Turner
investments by granting sleeping car company exclusive right to serve its line); Milton
Handler, Statement Before the Small Business Administration, 11 ANn:TRUST BuLL. 417,
424-25 (1966) (contending that exclusive dealing arrangement can avoid putting seller at
buyer's mercy and thereby help induce relationship-specific investment by seller).
244 See Meese, supra note 153, at 832-41 (explaining how developments in economic
theory led courts to adjust standards governing nonstandard contracts by monopolists).
245 See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-51, 57-59 (1977)
(rejecting application of per se ban on non price vertical restraints given propensity of such
restraints to overcome free riding and thus encourage optimal promotion expenditures);
Koppers Co., 77 F.T.C. 1675, 1684 (1970) (holding that requirements contracts "are particularly suspect when used by a monopolist" and that such agreements were unlawful absent
"very strong justification"); see also infra notes 272-79 and accompanying text (discussing
lower courts' application of relaxed standard to various forms of conduct).
246 ALexis search reveals at least fifty citations of Professor Areeda's work in the U.S.
Reports (last searched Apr. 1, 2010). See also Kovacic, supra note 149, at 43-71 (documenting influence of Harvard School on various antitrust doctrines generated by Supreme
Court).
247 Stephen Breyer, In Memoriam: Phillip E. Areeda, 109 HARV. L. REv. 889, 890
(1996).
248 472 u.s. 585 (1985).
249 /d. at 596.

June 2010]

DEBUNKING THE PURCHASER WELFARE ACCOUNT

709

treatise. 250 The instructions, which the Court quoted with approval,
elaborated on this distinction, noting that it was "legitimate" (and thus
lawful per se) for a monopolist to "tak[e] advantage of scale economies by constructing a large and efficient factory."251 The instructions
contained no caveat for instances in which the resulting market power
due to this construction injured purchasers in a relevant market. More
generally, the instructions stated that a monopoly gained or maintained by means of a "superior product, well-run business, or luck"
was beyond reproach, again without any caveat for practices that
injured purchasers in the relevant market. 252
In approving these instructions, the Court noted that the "central
message" of the Sherman Act was that firms could obtain new customers lawfully through "internal expansion" and "competing successfully."253 The Court cited with approval the passage authored by
Professors Areeda and Turner which narrowed the definition of
unlawful exclusionary conduct and approved of conduct necessary to
"effect" or "further" competition on the merits. In doing so, the Court
also adopted the Areeda-Turner standard for "exclusionary" conduct,
repeating that it "comprehends at the most behavior that not only (1)
tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not
further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily
restrictive way." 254
In the same paragraph, the Court quoted with approval Judge
Bork's definition of exclusionary conduct as conduct that excludes
rivalry on some basis other than efficiency, apparently treating that
definition as co-extensive with that offered by Professors Areeda and
Turner. 255 By contrast, a proponent of the purchaser welfare standard
has expressly rejected Bork's test as inconsistent with a purchaser welfare approach to section 2, further indicating that the Court implicitly
accepted a total welfare approach. 256
Aspen Skiing establishes the following two-part test for evaluating claims of exclusion. First, so-called competition on the merits,
250 See supra note 231 and accompanying text (providing Areeda-Turner definition of
exclusionary conduct).
251 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 597.
252 See id. at 596.
253 /d. at 600 (quoting United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'! Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 116
(1975)).
254 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605 n.32 (quoting AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 124,
'II 626b) (emphasis added).
255 See id. at 605.
256 See Salop, supra note 3, at 328-29 (providing example of exclusionary conduct that
would offend purchaser welfare standard but would not offend standard articulated by
Bork).
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such as realizing economies of scale (by internal expansion) is "legitimate" and thus lawful per se. Second, conduct that is not itself competition on the merits is nonetheless lawful, even if it disadvantages
rivals, if it "furthers" competition on the merits and is not overly
restrictive. Neither portion of this test requires the court to assess the
impact of the conduct on purchasers in the relevant market or
somehow balance the benefits of the conduct against its harms, however the latter are conceived. 257 In other words, the Court announced
that competition on the merits, even when conducted by an adjudicated monopolist, is lawful per se, without regard to the impact of such
conduct on purchasers in the relevant market. 258 Conduct that furthers
such competition is lawful, unless there is a less restrictive means of
achieving the same benefits. This less restrictive alternative test follows naturally from a total welfare standard, in that it minimizes the
misallocation of resources and, consequently, reduces externalities
produced by the restraint.259
The Court went on to affirm the jury's verdict that the defendant
had maintained its monopoly through conduct that did not constitute
or further competition on the merits.260 In so doing, the Court emphasized the defendant's inability to articulate any beneficial rationale for
its conduct. 261 Conversely, if the defendant had been able to articulate
257 See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 596-97 (citing with approval trial court's instructions
that monopoly power derived from superior business ability or efficiency does not violate
section 2).
258 While the Court examined the impact of defendant's conduct on purchasers, it
plainly assumed that a negative impact was a necessary condition for liability but not a
sufficient one; immediately after stating that it was "relevant" to consider the impact of the
defendant's conduct on purchasers, the Court quoted with approval the Areeda-Turner
formulation as well as Judge Bork's definition of exclusionary conduct. !d. at 605 & nn.
32-33.
259 Meese, supra note 63, at 112 (explaining how proper application of less restrictive
alternative test can be characterized as externality regulation).
260 See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605-11 (outlining Court's characterization of defendant's actions).
261 See id. at 608-11 ("Thus, the evidence supports an inference that Ski Co. was not
motivated by efficiency concerns and that it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and
consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long run impact on smaller rivals.").
Professor Robert Pitofsky claims that Aspen Skiing "require[s] a balancing approach
that compares the adverse impact of the refusal to deal on the competitive process with any
efficiency effects that may simultaneously arise, taking into account the possibility of less
restrictive alternatives that might produce comparable efficiencies." Pitofsky, Testimony,
supra note 3, at 5; see also Pitofsky, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 3, at 217 & n.24 (to
same effect); Gavil, supra note 8, at 21-23 (claiming that law is ambiguous on this question); Varney, supra note 5, at 11-14 (reading Aspen Skiing and Microsoft as establishing
requirement that courts "weigh" procompetitive and anticompetitive effects and determine
whether "on balance the net effect of [a monopolist's] conduct harms competition and
consumers"). I respectfully disagree with Professor Pitofsky's characterization of Aspen
Skiing, which in my view finds no support in the language or rationale of the decision. The
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(and prove) such a benefit, the defendant's conduct would have survived unscathed, so long as it was not broader than necessary to
achieve the benefit in question.
Six years later, the Court reiterated this approach in a case
involving a challenge to a monopolist's tying agreements and refusals
to deal. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, the Court
held that section 2 forbids only the "willful acquisition or maintenance
of [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development as
a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident. " 262 Thus, the Court continued, mere possession of a
monopoly does not offend section 2, unless the defendant uses that
power to foreclose rivals' opportunities. 263 Applying this test to the
facts before it, the Court held that a plaintiff could establish a prima
facie case of unlawful monopolization by showing that the monopolist's conduct excluded its rivals from a significant portion of the marketplace and thereby strengthened its monopoly position. 264 The
Court also held that, if the plaintiffs should succeed in making out
their prima facie case, the defendant could nonetheless prevail by
establishing that the challenged conduct was supported by "valid business reasons." 265 The only caveat was that the conduct must be no
word "balance" does not appear in the opinion; nor does any synonym thereof. Moreover,
neither the language in the opinion nor the jury instructions the Court implicitly approved
implies that the finder of fact should "balance," "weigh," or "compare" the benefits of a
restraint or other practice against any harms that the restraint produces. Instead, the Court
made it absolutely plain that conduct that constitutes "competition on the merits" or furthers such competition cannot violate section 2, absent a less restrictive method of furthering said competition.
To be sure, application of a less restrictive alternative test depends on the assumption
that the benefits of a practice coexist with harms. Absent such coexistence, there would be
no rationale for encouraging a different method of achieving the same benefits. Meese,
supra note 153, at 761. Still, Aspen Skiing's invocation of this test does not suggest the
Court was employing a purchaser welfare standard for two reasons. First, the Court did not
equate restrictiveness with impact upon prices paid by purchasers in the relevant market.
Second, under the Court's approach, proof that a practice is the least restrictive means of
producing particular benefits would shield the defendant from liability, without regard to
whether the benefits in question outweighed the harms or whether the restraint resulted in
higher or lower prices. Thus, while the less restrictive alternative test requires monopolists
to produce as much possible, it does not require them immediately to share those benefits
with purchasers.
262 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992) (quoting
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).
263 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482-83 (citing United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100,
107 (1948)).
264 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482-83 (stating that, absent valid business reasons,
adopting exclusionary policy to maintain or strengthen monopoly violates section 2).
265 See id. at 483 ("[R]espondents have presented evidence that Kodak took exclusionary action to maintain its parts monopoly .... ").
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broader than necessary to achieve the benefits it claimed. 266 Applying
this standard, the Court affirmed the denial of the defendant's motion
for summary judgment on the monopolization claims because the
plaintiff had adduced evidence that the defendant could achieve its
legitimate purposes via less restrictive means. 267
Here again the Court announced and applied the Areeda-Turner
definition of unlawful exclusion, a definition that did not contemplate
balancing or otherwise turn on the impact of the challenged conduct
on purchasers in the relevant market. Instead, even if the conduct in
question excluded rivals from the marketplace, the defendant would
nonetheless prevail if it could show that such exclusion was necessary
to achieve significant benefits, without regard to whether the practice
on balance harmed purchasers.
The Court gave greater content to competition on the merits in
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 268 There,
the Court reiterated the conclusion of Judge Wyzanski, the Harvard
School, and others that above-cost pricing was lawful per se, expressly
relying upon the work of Professors Areeda and Turner to support its
conclusions. 269 It would not matter, the Court said, if such competition fortified a monopoly or otherwise facilitated the exercise of
market power. 270 Regardless of the ultimate impact on purchaser welfare, proof that the defendant had priced below some measure of cost
was a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a showing of monopolization through predatory pricing.271
The message of these decisions and academic commentary was
not lost on the lower courts. Even before Aspen Skiing, for instance,
in the watershed case of Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
the Second Circuit expressly repudiated the more extreme manifestations of Judge Hand's Alcoa opinion. 272 The court quoted United Shoe
with approval for the proposition that section 2 does not condemn one
"who merely by superior skill and intelligence got the whole business
266 See id. at 483-86 (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment after finding
that plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to suggest that Kodak's business practices
may have been unnecessary to achieve purported benefits).
267 See id. (outlining defendant's justifications and plaintiffs responses).
268 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993) (holding that section 2 does not forbid aggressive pricing
that preserves monopolist's dominant position).
269 See id. at 224 (citing Areeda & Thmer, supra note 223, at 708-09).
270 See id. (stating that its standard applied "[e)ven if the ultimate effect of the [lawful
price] cut is to induce or reestablish supracompetitive pricing").
271 See id. at 223 (holding that proof of below-cost pricing is necessary to predatory
pricing case against monopolist).
272 See 603 F.2d 263, 273-75 (2d Cir. 1979) (overruling Alcoa in part); see also
Robinson, supra note 191, at 6-12 (discussing Berkey Photo's rejection of Alcoa).
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because nobody could do it as well." 273 Evaluating the plaintiff's claim
that Kodak had maintained its monopoly by means of unlawful conduct, the court carefully distinguished between two different sorts of
conduct capable of maintaining a monopoly: the use of power to disadvantage rivals, on the one hand, and superior skill or industry, such
as the realization of economies of scale, on the other. 274 The former
category was the basis for liability, while the latter was competition on
the merits and thus lawful per se. 275 Moreover, the court treated the
development of a new product, and the refusal to share such innovation with rivals, as competition on the merits. 276
To be clear, the court's test for distinguishing between these two
categories of conduct did not entail any examination of the impact of
the defendant's practices on purchasers in the relevant market or any
effort to balance harms against benefits. Instead, the court simply
asked whether conduct that disadvantaged rivals was supported by a
"valid business policy." 277 Finally, as if to eliminate any trace of doubt,
the court explained that simply charging a high price could not itself
violate section 2 if the monopoly in question was obtained or maintained via legitimate conduct. 278 Several other lower courts have
adhered to the same standard.279
273 Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 274 (quoting United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (D. Mass. 1953), atfd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam)). As the
Berkey court noted, Judge Wyzanski was himself quoting the legislative history of the Act;
see also Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 281 ("[A]s we have already indicated, a monopolist is
permitted, and indeed encouraged, by § 2 to compete aggressively on the merits .... "
(citing United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 344)); Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 29-30
(invoking this passage of legislative history among other evidence in support of argument
that Congress did not intend for Sherman Act to ban monopoly obtained by means of
superior efficiency).
274 See Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 274-75.
275 See id. at 274 ("A firm that has lawfully acquired a monopoly position is not barred
from taking advantage of scale economies by constructing, for example, a large and efficient factory. These benefits are a consequence of size and not an exercise of power over
the market." (quoting Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
597 (1985))).
276 /d. at 282-85.
277 /d. at 284.
278 See id at 274 & n.12 ("Nor is a lawful monopolist ordinarily precluded from charging
as high a price for its product as the market will accept."). The qualification "ordinarily"
was explained as allowing condemnation of "an illegal 'price squeeze' in another market."
/d. at 274 n.l2.
279 See, e.g., United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2005)
(applying standard to practice of exclusive dealing); see also United States v. AMR Corp.,
335 F.3d 1109, 1113 (lOth Cir. 2003) (distinguishing between behavior that abuses
monopoly power and that which simply "build[s] a better mousetrap"); Trans Sport, Inc. v.
Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186, 189-90 (2d Cir. 1992) (Marshall, J.) (collecting
authorities arguing that business-purpose defense can defeat section 2 claim); Cal.
Computer Prods. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 742 (9th Cir. 1979) (monopolist may main-
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Section 2's Harvard-inspired safe harbor for competition on the
merits (e.g., the realization of economies of scale and the development
of a superior product) cannot be squared with a purchaser-welfare
approach to antitrust law. 280 As courts and scholars have repeatedly
recognized, legitimate and lawful competition can, by excluding less
efficient rivals, result in a monopoly. 281 Or, such competition can fortify and protect a monopoly achieved by accident. In either case, the
exclusion of rivals who are less efficient, even if only slightly less efficient, can ultimately result in a monopoly and prices that are higher
than those that would obtain if section 2 doctrine instead prohibited
such conduct and preserved a deconcentrated market structure at the
expense of productive efficiency.2 8 2 In either case, the safe harbor for
competition on the merits may result in prices that are higher-and
purchaser welfare that is lower-than they were before such (pertain its "dominant position in the market it created through 'business acumen' which
[includes] shrewdness in profitable price competition"); Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958,
985 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[A]n entrepreneur is not protected from competition on the merits'the summum bonum of the Sherman Act.'" (quoting Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Co., 515 F.2d
835, 851 (5th Cir. 1975))); Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 709
(7th Cir. 1977) (holding proof of monopolists' "misuse" of its power necessary for section 2
liability); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 927 (lOth Cir. 1975) (arguing that section
2 leaves room for companies to protect market share through innovation); Cole v. Hughes
Tool Co., 215 F.2d 924, 932-33, 938 (lOth Cir. 1954) (en bane) (distinguishing leases from
those involved in United Shoe on ground that only latter deterred lessees from using competitors' products and holding that "[o]ne who gains a large portion of a market by manufacturing a better product and by furnishing better service to his customers, which
constitutes legitimate competition, is not denounced by the Sherman Act"); E.l. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 745-48 (1980) (invoking United Shoe's hostility toward
"contracts, arrangements, and policies" which, instead of encouraging competition on pure
merit, further dominance of particular firm and finding that defendant's continued expansion and refusal to license technology to competitors did not offend section 2).
280 Two scholars draw a different conclusion about the normative content of section 2
doctrine, albeit without mentioning Aspen Skiing, Eastman Kodak, United Shoe, appellate
decisions like Berkey Photo and Dentsply, "competition on the merits," or the AreedaTurner definition of exclusionary conduct quoted in Aspen Skiing and other decisions. See
Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 31, at 192 ("[T]he fundamental goal of antitrust law is to
protect consumers.").
281 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223-24
(1993) (arguing that there is no congnizable claim against businesses engaging in abovecost price competition); Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 274 (stating that Sherman Act does not
condemn monopoly gained by "superior skill and intelligence" (quoting United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (D. Mass. 1953), affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954)
(per curiam))); supra note 181 and accompanying text (explaining how competition on
merits can create or fortify monopoly); see also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596-97 (1985) (approving jury instruction that distinguished
between abuse of monopoly power and competitive market behavior).
282 See Areeda & Turner, supra note 223, at 706-07 (explaining that monopolists may
set low prices to prevent market entry and then allow prices eventually to return to higher,
monopolistic level); cf Williamson, supra note 30, at 22-23 (demonstrating that modest
efficiency gains can coincide with price increases).
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fectly lawful) competition took place.Z83 Indeed, lower courts have
often dismissed monopolization claims once the defendant adduces
convincing proof of benefits, without purporting to balance those benefits against harms or otherwise determine the overall impact of the
conduct on purchaser welfare. 284
This is not to say that current section 2 law reflects a perfectly
honed total welfare approach to monopolists' conduct. In a world
where judges and juries are omniscient, courts could read section 2 to
empower factfinders to make a case-by-case determination of whether
any particular practice increases or reduces overall welfare. But such
central planning is beyond the skill and ability of real world judges
and juries. As then-Judge Breyer reminded us, antitrust rules are necessarily imperfect, given the prohibitive administrative costs of perfection.285 For instance, competition on the merits, as courts have defined
it, can in some circumstances theoretically reduce total welfare. Economies of scale that enable a firm to drive rivals from the market may
provide the monopolist with only a slight cost advantage, with the
result that the deadweight loss resulting from such conduct may outweigh any efficiency gains. 286 Moreover, a test that allows monopolists
to abuse their power by charging whatever the market will bear will
encourage firms to engage in rent-seeking and thus to make investments that only make sense on the assumption that they will acquire
or maintain monopoly power. 287 The safe harbors for such conduct
under current law presumably reflect a judgment that more finely
tuned examinations, while nominally designed to maximize total welfare, will in fact destroy more wealth than they create by consuming
scarce administrative resources and deterring beneficial conduct.288
283 See Areeda & Turner, supra note 223, at 706-07 (arguing that availability of
monopoly profits increases incentives for monopolies to realize efficiencies).
284 See, e.g., Trans Sport, Inc., 964 F.2d at 189-90 ("[V]alid business rationales are sufficient to establish a prima facie case of lawful conduct.").
285 See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983)
("[W]hile technical economic discussion helps to inform the antitrust laws, those laws
cannot precisely replicate the economists' (sometimes conflicting) views .... Rules that
seek to embody every economic complexity and qualification may well, through the
vagaries of administration, prove counter-productive, undercutting the very economic ends
they seek to serve.").
286 Cf Williamson, supra note 30 (modeling tradeoff between efficiencies resulting from
economies of scale and market power simultaneously produced by merger to monopoly).
287 See RICHARD A. PosNER, ANTITRusT LAw 13-14 (2d ed. 2001) ("[A]n opportunity
to obtain a lucrative transfer payment in the form of monopoly profits will attract real
resources into efforts by sellers to monopolize and by consumers to avoid being charged
monopoly prices .... ").
288 See Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 15 (resting argument for relatively permissive antitrust rules on assumption that misallocation of resources is only harm from monopoly

716

NEW YORK UNWERSITY LAW REVIEW

C.

[Vol. 85:659

The Demands of Stare Decisis

Of course, the mere fact that courts repeatedly adopt a total welfare standard-and have never adopted a purchaser welfare standard-does not itself establish the original meaning of the Sherman
Act. Courts may have misunderstood the meaning of the statute (and
thwarted the will of Congress) by declining to ban conduct that, for
instance, creates wealth but also reduces the welfare of purchasers in
the relevant market.2s9 Even longstanding constructions of a statute
can be entirely incorrect.
Even so, courts do not lightly repudiate a deeply rooted construction of a statute. 29o When courts miscons,true a statute, the remedy can
usually be found in the legislature and not the courts. Indeed, courts
often distinguish and justify the weaker claims of stare decisis in the
constitutional context on the ground that it is significantly easier for a
legislature to amend a statute in response to judicial construction than
it is for the body politic to amend the Constitution in response to a
perceived judicial misconstruction of that fundamental charter. 291 If in
fact the purchaser welfare standard reflects the appropriate construction of section 2 of the Sherman Act, despite repeated judicial decisions embracing a total welfare standard, then it would seem that
proponents of such a standard should take their case to Congress and
not to the courts or enforcement agencies.292
Still, when it comes to antitrust, the normal principles of stare
decisis do not apply with full force. Over the past few decades in particular, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to overrule its own antitrust decisions, particularly those that had articulated per se rules
pricing and that false positives deter cost-reducing conduct and increase cost of producing
market's entire output).
289 See Lande, supra note 3, at 93-96 (marshalling evidence from Sherman Act's legislative history that Congress was concerned with distribution of welfare gains and not just
gains themselves).
290 See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 732-33 (1975)
(declining to disturb longstanding interpretation by lower courts that Congress had
declined to overturn).
291 See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 & n.l (1991) (collecting thirty-three
constitutional decisions that Supreme Court had overruled in previous twenty years and
noting that stare decisis has stronger claim in statutory context than in constitutional context); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-10 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Helvering v. Montain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938) and
Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938) (arguing that demands of stare decisis
are less pressing in constitutional context); see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989) ("Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of
statutory interpretation .... ").
292 Cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 32 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (contending that any change to Court's longstanding per se rule against certain
tying contracts should come from Congress, not courts).
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against particular restraints. 293 The Court has justified this relaxed
stare decisis approach by asserting that the Sherman Act is really a
"common-law statute," that is, a delegation from Congress to the
courts to fashion a common law governing trade restraints and other
business practices. 294 Before there was a Sherman Act, courts articulating the common law of trade restraints repeatedly held that
changed economic circumstances could justify the reformulation of
case law so as to better implement the policies animating the doctrine.295 As the Court put it more than two decades ago, the Congress
that passed the Sherman Act adopted the common law of trade
restraints "along with its dynamic potential" as reflected in these early
common law decisions. 296
Thus the total welfare normative premise may be more vulnerable than it might first seem, at least if proponents of a different
approach can convince the Supreme Court that Congress had something else in mind when it passed the Sherman Act. Surely, the
common law delegation to antitrust courts is sufficiently capacious to
empower judges to, for instance, abandon a total welfare premise in
favor of one focused on the welfare of purchasers in the relevant
market.

293 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881-82
(2007) (overruling nearly century-old ban on minimum resale pricing agreements); State
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7-8 (1997) (overruling twenty-nine-year ban on maximum
resale price maintenance); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59
(1977) (overruling ban on nonprice territorial restraints).
294 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899 ("Stare decisis is not as significant in this case, however,
because the issue before us is the scope of the Sherman Act."); Khan, 522 U.S. at 20-21
("[T]he general presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less
force with respect to the Sherman Act in light of the accepted view that Congress
'expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common
law tradition."' (quoting Nat'! Soc'y of Prof'! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688
(1978))); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (arguing
that term "restraint of trade" in Sherman Act "invokes the common law itself, and not
merely the static content that the common law assigned to the term").
295 See, e.g., Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396,409 (1889) (noting that definition of
restraint of trade is "not ... inflexible and has been considerably modified" in light of
changed economic circumstances); Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522, 525-26
(Mo. Ct. App. 1880) ("It is not that contracts in restraint of trade are any more legal or
enforceable now than they were at any former period, but that the courts look differently
at the question as to what is a restraint of trade."); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E.
419,421-23 (N.Y. 1887) (endorsing modification of common law of trade restraints in light
of changed economic circumstances); Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pin. 123, 139 (Wis. 1851) (analyzing law in light of changing economic situation).
296 See Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 732 (arguing Sherman Act adopted common law
approach to antitrust law).
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Not so fast. The Court's invocation of the common law does not
necessarily imply carte blanche power over normative approaches. 297
In fact, one can explain the various departures from precedent mentioned above without imputing to the Court the power to alter normative standards at its pleasure. Indeed, in each of the decisions
referenced above, the Court claimed at least to be applying an
unchanging normative standard in light of changed understandings of
the positive economic impact of the practice in question. 298 More metaphorically, each of these departures from precedent can be explained
as the "translation" of a previous application of an unchanging normative premise in light of new information about the economic impact of
a challenged practice in the real world. 299 This conclusion follows naturally from the very nature of the rule of reason, which requires courts
to employ reason to determine whether a challenged practice violates
the "public policy which the act embodies." 300 There is, by contrast, no
similar rationale for revising the normative premise that informs
monopolization doctrine, since changes in economic theory cannot by
themselves undermine the value judgment inherent in the choice
between total welfare and purchaser welfare. 301
Indeed, there is good reason to conclude the opposite, namely,
that the claims of stare decisis in this context are particularly strong,
given the widespread reliance on this normative premise throughout
the antitrust community and the resulting intellectual infrastructure.
For decades, legal scholars, economists, and judges have been engaged
in a multilevel dialogue about the appropriate standards governing
conduct by monopolists. The result has been an impressive body of
case law and overarching principles that serve as reference points and
accepted paradigms which inform continuing discussion and empirical
and theoretical refinements of possible solutions to antitrust

297 See Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 47-48 ("Sherman and others clearly
believed that they were legislating a policy and delegating to the courts the elaboration of
subsidiary rules.").
298 See Khan, 522 U.S. at 15-18 (reconsidering precedent banning maximum resale price
maintenance based on changed understanding of restraints' economic effects); Sylvania,
433 U.S. at 50-59 (reconsidering ban on nonprice vertical restraints in light of new learning
about impact of restraints).
299 See Meese, supra note 63, at 89-92 (discussing rule of reason in context of evolving
economic theory); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1165, 1247-51
{1993) (describing such an approach to interpretation and application of Sherman Act).
300 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911).
301 See Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 48 (arguing that courts interpreting
Sherman Act must look to economic theory to determine how to implement congressional
purpose).
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problems, both old and new. 302 A sudden bolt out of the blue, presumably announced in a single decision, declaring or implying that so
much antitrust doctrine rested on a fundamental misunderstanding of
the statute's basic purpose would call into question-and perhaps
render useless-each major section 2 decision even arguably based
upon a total welfare standard, including the innumerable decisions
holding that competition on the merits is lawful per se.3°3 Private parties could no longer rely upon such decisions as accurate accounts of
their legal obligations, thereby undermining important economic reliance interests. 304 Firms hoping for certainty would instead have to
await the slow and uncertain creation of a new body of (hopefully)
coherent doctrine. 305 Moreover, scholars and practitioners would lack
accepted paradigms they could apply to analogous problems or from
which they could derive more general principles. 306 New decisions
premised on a purchaser welfare standard would be incommensurable
with those premised on a different approach. 307 These would be very
high costs to pay for fidelity to a purchaser welfare standard, particularly in light of congressional acquiescence to a complex body of law
premised on a desire to maximize total welfare.
VI
CouNTERARGUMENTS

Proponents of a purchaser welfare balancing test have offered
two basic arguments in support of their position that merit addressing.
First, some have suggested that the safe harbor for unilateral competition on the merits is a sort of anomaly, an exception to a more general
302 Cf. Kovacic, supra note 149, at 72 ("Both the Harvard and Chicago Schools abide by
the view that antitrust doctrine should reflect the rigorous application of microeconomic
theory and should respond to insights from empirical work about the implementation of
antitrust rules and about the impact of specific business practices.").
303 See supra notes 278-79 (collecting authorities holding that competition on merits is
lawful per se ).
304 Cf. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) ("Considerations in favor of stare
decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance
interests are involved .... ").
305 Cf Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47-54 (1977) (criticizing and
overruling previous decision that had departed from well-settled case law and thus created
confusion and disparate treatment of economically similar conduct).
306 Cf THOMAS S. KuHN, THE STRucruRE oF SCIENTIFIC REvoLUTIONS 23 (1962) ("In
science, ... a paradigm is rarely an object for replication. Instead, like an accepted judicial
decision in the common law, it is an object for further articulation and specification under
new Or more Stringent conditions."); WOLFGANG STEGMULLER, THE STRUCI"URE AND
DYNAMICS OF THEORIES 170-80 (1976) (discussing COncept Of paradigm).
307 See KuHN, supra note 306, at 103 (explaining how competing scientific frameworks
are often incommensurable, thereby preventing meaningful dialogue between frameworks'
respective practitioners).
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purchaser welfare principle approach that can and does animate the
rest of section 2 law. Second, some have invoked the D.C. Circuit's
fairly recent decision in the Microsoft case, which articulated and purported to apply a rule-of-reason balancing test similar to that applied
under section 1-where courts focus on purchaser welfare-to a
monopolist's conduct. This Part finds both arguments wanting.
A.

A Bifurcated Standard?

Some have recognized that current law's safe harbor for competition on the merits reflects a social welfare approach to section 2 to the
exclusion of a purchaser welfare approach. 308 Nonetheless, these
scholars contend that conduct not historically deemed competition on
the merits-such as exclusive dealing contracts, refusals to deal, and
the like-is currently and properly judged under a purchaser welfare
standard, even if courts judge unilateral conduct such as pricing decisions by something akin to a total welfare standard. 309 Indeed, some
have even asserted that the safe harbor for competition on the merits
in the form of above-cost pricing and similar conduct is entirely consistent with a purchaser welfare balancing test and that the defendantfriendly nature of this safe harbor simply reflects judicial concern
about the negative impact on purchaser welfare of more aggressive
scrutiny of such conduct. 310 Thus, these scholars argue, once a plaintiff
demonstrates that conduct falling outside the safe harbor produces
anticompetitive harm, courts can and should balance any benefits that
the conduct produces against the simultaneously-produced harms and
ban that conduct which injures purchasers. 311 Under this approach,
308 See Jacobson & Sher, supra note 5, at 780-84 (conceding that Areeda-Turner test is
current test for pricing behavior); Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct:
Section 2, the Rule of Reason, and the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73
ANTITRUST L.J. 435, 464-65 (2006) (asserting that current rules governing pricing and
product improvement rest on rejection of purchaser welfare approach).
309 See Jacobson & Sher, supra note 5, at 781-83, 785-800 (contending that so-called
"no economic sense" test is rooted in Areeda-Turner test for predatory pricing and arguing
that courts should apply purchaser welfare balancing test to exclusive dealing contracts);
Lao, supra note 7, at 452-62 (advocating lenient analysis of predatory pricing and product
development claims and arguing in favor of purchaser welfare balancing test for analysis of
monopolist's distribution restraints); Popofsky, supra note 308, at 441-48 (contending that
section 2 doctrine reflects spectrum whereby certain forms of conduct should receive more
intrusive scrutiny than others); id. at 465 (opining that purchaser welfare balancing test is
not always improper).
310 See Popofsky, supra note 308, at 465 (arguing that case-specific analysis of such conduct is difficult, error-prone, and thus likely to undermine incentives to compete and lead
to harm to consumers over long term).
311 See Jacobson & Sher, supra note 5, at 799-801 (arguing that section 2 should ban
exclusive dealing contracts by monopolists whenever harm to purchasers outweighs benefits and leads to higher prices); Lao, supra note 7, at 456-62 (advocating purchaser welfare

June 2010]

DEBUNKING THE PURCHASER WELFARE ACCOUNT

721

section 2 doctrine would effectively reflect one welfare standard for
some conduct and another welfare standard for other conduct.
These scholars do not assert that Congress actually contemplated
such a bifurcated welfare standard within section 2. 312 Instead, they
apparently assert that the safe harbor for competition on the merits is
a narrowly tailored departure from the presumptive purchaser welfare
standard that otherwise governs section 2 of the Sherman Act. This
safe harbor, some say, is justified by the unambiguous and tangible
benefits of the sort of conduct that courts define as competition on the
merits, including low prices, product improvements, advertising, promotion, and the like.313 Rigorous application of a purchaser welfare
standard to such conduct, it is said, would unduly chill procompetitive
conduct and actually reduce the welfare of purchasers as well as the
welfare of society as a whole. 314 Thus, it is said, the application of
relaxed standards to generally beneficial conduct does not reflect an
overall embrace of a total welfare principle.
This claim ignores the intellectual roots of the safe harbor, which
the Harvard School developed and endorsed as a means of furthering
total welfare and not the welfare of purchasers. 315 In any event, there
are several more fundamental reasons to reject the claim that the safe
harbor for competition on the merits is merely an exception to a
larger purchaser welfare principle embraced by section 2 doctrine. For
one thing, this claim appears inconsistent with actual section 2 doctrine, which provides a safe harbor for some conduct not deemed
competition on the merits. Moreover, such a bifurcated standard
would offend the basic antitrust principle that doctrinal distinctions
should rest upon economic substance, and not formalistic line
drawing, by subjecting economically indistinguishable practices to
varying section 2 standards. Finally, this approach contravenes the
most recent Supreme Court decision examining exclusionary contracts
balancing test for analysis of monopolist's distribution restraints such as tying and exclusive
dealing contracts).
312 Indeed, Professor Salop would apply the consumer welfare effect standard to all
practices governed by section 2. See Salop, supra note 3, at 336-43 (arguing for broad
applicability by addressing common concerns about consumer welfare effect standard).
313 See Jacobson & Sher, supra note 5, at 781-83 (arguing that Areeda-Turner test for
predatory pricing was premised on fear that more intrusive test would unduly deter
procompetitive price cuts); Popofsky, supra note 308, at 465 (contending that safe harbor
treatment is lintited to situations in which case-specific search for net economic effects
would be difficult and error-prone).
314 See, e.g., Popofsky, supra note 308, at 465 (explaining that risk of error leads to false
positives that chill innovation).
315 See supra notes 165-77 and accompanying text (describing Harvard School origins of
safe harbor for competition on merits and its focus on total welfare).
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entered by a monopolist, a decision that can only be explained as an
effort to implement a total welfare standard.

1.

The Scope of Section 2's Safe Harbor

The "bifurcated standards" explanation for the lax treatment of
competition on the merits would predict relatively searching scrutiny
for refusals to deal by monopolists, since such conduct is not competition on the merits as defined by courts. And in fact, some proponents
of a purchaser welfare balancing test have advocated such an intrusive
approach to refusals to deaJ.3 16
The actual state of the law, however, is quite different. One need
look no further than Aspen Skiing: That case did not involve traditional competition on the merits, but rather the sort of refusal to deal
that some scholars would analyze under a more intrusive purchaser
welfare standard. In Aspen Skiing, however, the Supreme Court
approved a jury instruction that distinguished between monopoly
gained or fortified by conduct motivated by "legitimate business reasons," on the one hand, and that gained or maintained by conduct that
"unnecessarily excludes or handicaps competitors, on the other." 317
The instruction did not distinguish between competition on the merits
and refusals to deal, instead providing that a monopolist would avoid
liability if it could adduce a "valid business reason[]" for its refusaJ.3 18
And the Court affirmed the verdict for the plaintiff precisely because
the defendant could not adduce such a justification. 319 Later in the
opinion, the Court quoted from the Areeda-Turner treatise, which
advocated a safe harbor for competition on the merits as well as conduct that "further[ed]" such competition. 320 The Court applied the
same test in Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, which also
involved refusals to deal, relying upon Aspen Skiing for the proposition that proof of benefits would avoid liability under section 2, sub-

316 See supra notes 308-09 and accompanying text; see also Steven C. Salop, Testimony
Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission, Avoiding Error in the Antitrust Analysis
of Unilateral Refusals To Deal 6-7 (Sept. 21, 2005), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.
ed u/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Salop_Sta temen t_Revised% 209-21. pdf (advocating
application of purchaser welfare balancing test to refusals to deal). But see Lao, supra note
7, at 454-55 (advocating lenient analysis of refusals to deal despite support for purchaser
welfare test in other contexts).
317 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 597 (1985).
318 /d. at 597.
319 /d. at 608-11.
320 /d. at 605 n.32.
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ject only to a no-less-restrictive-alternative limitation. 321 Lower courts
have applied the same test.322
Perhaps, though, proponents of the purchaser welfare standard
have simply drawn the line in the wrong place. That is, perhaps the
law (properly) treats all unilateral conduct, including refusals to deal,
with relative laxity, while subjecting concerted action, such as exclusive dealing and tying contracts, to greater scrutiny of the sort more
consistent with a purchaser welfare balancing test. 323 Indeed, the line
between competition on the merits, on the one hand, and refusals to
deal, on the other, is not particularly precise. After all, a firm cannot
realize economies of scale or create a superior product unless it can
decline to sell its output at cost, or even at a monopoly price, to
rivals. 324
Any effort to explain away the lax treatment of unilateral conduct as some sort of anomaly is still destined to fail, however. For one
thing, the line between refusals to deal and concerted action is by no
means bright. In Aspen itself, the defendant's refusal to deal was
simply a bargaining technique designed to convince the plaintiff to
accept a smaller share of the fruits of their joint venture. 325 The plaintiff balked at accepting this proposal and sued instead. 326 What looked
like a simple refusal to deal was in fact an effort to reach an agreement allocating the fruits of joint investments, perhaps in a manner
that would have prevented free riding by the plaintiff.3 27
In any event, any exception for unilateral conduct would seem to
dwarf the supposed general rule. If Ronald Coase and Phillip Areeda
are correct, most economic activity is unilateral; that is, it takes place
within the boundaries of individual firms. 328 Indeed, this assumption
See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482-83 (1992).
See Trans Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186, 189-91 (2d Cir. 1992)
(stating that plaintiff's inability to show proferred business justifications were pretextual
doomed its case); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 284 (2d Cir.
1979) (holding that business justification will save otherwise anticompetitive behavior).
323 See Lao, supra note 7, at 451-56 (suggesting this approach).
324 Alan J. Meese, Property, Aspen, and Refusals To Deal, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 81, 96
(2006); see also Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 281 (noting that competition on merits includes
refusals to deal); Areeda & Turner, supra note 223, at 707 (contending that monopoly
profits can provide incentives that encourage beneficial conduct).
325 See Meese, supra note 324, at 102-05 (suggesting that it was Highlands, not Ski Co.,
that refused to deal).
326 See id. (describing breakdown of negotiations).
327 See id. at 105-11 (pointing out that Ski Co. may have insisted upon changed revenue
allocation formula in order to deter free riding by Highlands).
328 See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HovENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw Cj[ 1462a (2d ed.
2003) ("In most cases the relevant economic actor is the firm ... .");see also id. Cj[ 1464c, at
206 ("Conspiracies among unrelated units are relatively infrequent .... "); R.H. Coase, The
Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. EcoN. REv. 713, 714 (1992) ("[M]ost
321

322
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led Professor Areeda to support the Supreme Court's conclusion that
purely unilateral conduct falls outside of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Areeda believed that subjecting all such conduct to section 1
scrutiny would overburden the antitrust enforcement machinery and
subject myriad business decisions to judicial scrutiny, without regard
to the market share of the defendant. 329 Thus, any doctrinal distinction between unilateral conduct (including refusals to deal), on the
one hand, and concerted action, on the other, would leave most conduct by monopolists beyond the scope of the supposedly presumptive
purchaser welfare standard. 330 If there is a difference in the normative
standard applied to unilateral conduct, on the one hand, and concerted action on the other, then the purchaser welfare standard would
be the exception and not the rule-not the other way around-and an
exception that would require additional justification.

2.

The Illusory Economic Distinction Between Unilateral Conduct
and Concerted Action

One should not lightly attribute such a bifurcated welfare standard to antitrust courts. After all, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
stated that doctrinal distinctions under the Sherman Act should rest
upon economic realities and not formalistic line drawing. 331 At times
the Court has gone even further, holding that disparate treatment of
economically similar conduct requires courts to overrule the decision
resources in a modern economic system are employed within firms .... "); cf. Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Thbe Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771-77 (1984) (holding that conduct
undertaken by single firm is "unilateral" and thus not "concerted" action subject to section
1 of Sherman Act).
329 See AREEDA & HovENKAMP, supra note 328, <J[ 1462a ("[S]ubjecting virtually every
decision made within a firm to Sherman Act § 1 scrutiny would not only overtax the limits
of our antitrust enforcement institutions, it would also involve judges and commissioners
with the daily business decisions of every firm.").
330 To be sure, the relative scarcity of concerted action by monopolists could in part
reflect relatively lax treatment of unilateral conduct under section 2, which could induce
monopolists to perform tasks internally they might otherwise have left to the market. See
Alan J. Meese, lntrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the Firm, 83 N.C. L. REv. 5, 30-31
(2004) (explaining how relatively lax scrutiny of otherwise identical conduct can induce
firms to integrate forward, thereby transforming activity that was once "concerted action"
into "unilateral conduct").
331 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466--67
(1992) ("Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market
realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law."); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723-24 (1988) (stating that economic realities should define boundaries of per se rule, even if those realities require departure from long-established precedents); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47-58 (1977) (rejecting
distinction between consignment and other agreements made by prior case law as formalistic and inconsistent with economic reality).
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creating the anomaly. 332 Finally, the Court has perceptively noted that
disparate treatment of similar forms of concerted and unilateral action
may cause firms to integrate forward, foregoing more efficient concerted action simply to avoid more intrusive antitrust scrutiny.333
It is certainly possible to draw a formal line between unilateral
conduct, such as refusals to deal and other conduct that hampers
rivals. Yet there does not appear to be any economic substance supporting enhanced and more hostile scrutiny of the latter than of the
former. Such a distinction may well have made sense fifty years ago,
when neoclassical price theory and its workable competition model
supplied the sole method for interpreting the causes and consequences
of nonstandard agreements like exclusive dealing and tying contracts
entered by monopolists. According to price theory and workable competition, individual firms made the economy's allocational decisions
after observing relevant prices in input and output markets. A firm
also realized technological efficiencies within its own boundaries,
purchasing inputs in the spot market and transforming them into outputs. 334 At the same time, the workable competition model could not
identify any beneficial purposes for concerted action between two or
more firms, at least none that parties could not achieve via less restrictive means. 335 This intellectual milieu supported a judicial hostility
toward exclusionary agreements that manifested itself in decisions
such as Grinnell and United Shoe, both of which condemned nonstandard agreements entered by monopolists, without regard to any justifications the defendants might offer.336
The workable competition model's hostility toward nonstandard
agreements could readily support a bifurcated approach to different
forms of conduct alleged to be exclusionary. After all, if conduct not
deemed competition on the merits both threatens purchaser welfare
and only rarely produces benefits, then more searching scrutiny of
332 See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 56-57 (holding that disparate treatment of consignment and
other agreements resulting in territorial exclusivity required reconsideration of precedent
creating such distinction).
333 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 16-17 (1997) (explaining that per se rule
against concerted maximum price fixing had induced firms to integrate forward to avoid
such scrutiny).
334 See OuvER E. WILLIAMSON, THE EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS oF CAPITALISM 371
(1985) (explaining that, during this era, economists believed that "true economies take a
technological form, [and] hence are fully realized within firms" and so, according to pricetheoretic paradigm, "there is nothing to be gained by introducing nonstandard terms into
market-mediated exchange").
335 See Meese, supra note 63, at 115-19 (documenting and explaining applied price
theory's hostility toward nonstandard contracts).
336 See supra notes 198-218 and accompanying text (discussing workable competition
theory and its impact on Grinnell and United Shoe).
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such conduct can protect purchasers from harm without at the same
time condemning conduct that might enhance purchaser welfare. If
this is the case, then the cost of falsely condemning such conduct is
very small indeed. 337
A bifurcated approach makes far less sense, if any at all, given the
advent of transaction cost economics (TCE) and its derivative theory
of the firm. 338 TCE teaches that unilateral conduct-including competition on the merits-is itself the product of concerted action between
potentially independent and fully autonomous individuals. 339 For
instance, what antitrust treats as a single firm's decision to price above
its costs but below those of its rivals is, according to TCE, an agreement between the firm's owners, who control the firm's property, and
its employees, whom the owners contractually empower to sell the
firm's property at a given price. 340 Such an agreement is, in economic
substance, indistinguishable from an agreement between two
vertically-related independent firms to reduce prices.341 The same is
true for a firm's decision to increase or decrease output. 342 Further, a
firm's decision to advertise and promote its own products, but not
those of its rivals, is also the result of such an agreement. Finally, a
franchisor that integrates forward and then directs its outlets to
purchase particular inputs does so pursuant to contracts between the
337 See Meese, supra note 63, at 124-34 (describing inhospitable case law during period).
Put more technically, in these circumstances, the cost of false positives is low.
338 See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 334 (describing TCE and its explanation of
firm organization as means of reducing transaction costs); R.H. Coase, The Nature of the
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (same).
339 See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 1-5
(1983) (explaining that firm is simply nexus of contracts among individual factors of production); Coase, supra note 338, at 388 (same).
340 See Ill. Corporate Travel v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 1986)
(analogizing minimum resale price maintenance agreements to managers of Sears telling
employees what price to charge for goods); see also Coase, supra note 338, at 391
(explaining that firm is merely contract whereby employees agree to follow owner's
instructions, within certain limits).
341 Cf. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990) (evaluating maximum resale price agreement between gasoline manufacturer and retailers); see also Frank
H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 886 (1981) (arguing for abandonment of per se invalidity of maximum price-fixing agreements).
342 See Chi. Prori Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593,598 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining
that, under current law, "the producers of Star Trek may decide to release two episodes a
week and grant exclusive licenses to show them, even though this reduces the number of
times episodes appear on TV"); Ill. Corporate Travel v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 889 F.2d 751,
753-54 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding airline's ban on advertisement of discounted prices lawful
per se because "travel service operators are the air carriers' agents"); Ill. Corporate Travel,
806 F.2d at 727 (explaining how contractual ban on price cutting by travel agents was analogous to "Sears ... tell[ing] the managers of its stores what prices to charge").
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firm's owners and those that operate its outlets. 343 Indeed, any time a
firm other than a sole proprietorship without employees "acts" (or
declines to act), it does so pursuant to agreements between participants in the venture-agreements that are always closely analogous to
other arrangements that courts treat as concerted action. 344 What antitrust law treats as unilateral conduct is in fact the result of nonstandard agreements that devotees of purchaser welfare would subject to
enhanced scrutiny.34s
At the same time, TCE also explained that concerted action in
the form of partial contractual integration could overcome "market
failures" that unbridled rivalry would otherwise produce. 346 For
instance, some have argued that exclusive territories ancillary to otherwise lawful ventures could prevent venture members from free
riding on promotional expenditures by fellow venturers.3 47 Thus, such
restraints would ensure that independent dealers would replicate the
amount and type of promotion that completely integrated firms would
produce. 348
Not all such agreements produce significant benefits. Nonetheless, there is very good reason to believe that, in fact, most nonstandard agreements are properly deemed beneficial or benign. As noted
earlier, the firm itself is a sort of nonstandard contract, indeed, a
nexus of nonstandard contracts. 349 Since most industries are unconcentrated or have low barriers to entry, it stands to reason that economic agents have adopted these arrangements for the purpose of
343 See Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 223, 231-32 (1978) (criticizing antitrust intervention in franchising
contracts because there is no economic distinction between franchisor-franchisee relationship and employer-employee relationship).
344 See Meese, supra note 330, at 57-64 (criticizing disparate treatment of "internal"
firm conduct and agreements between firms); cf Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) (conceding that activity within firm can be characterized as
agreement between firm's various participants).
345 See Meese, supra note 330, at 59 ("As a result, what economists and antitrust
scholars deem 'a firm,' capable of 'unilateral action,' is in fact a 'nexus of contracts'
between various individuals that supply labor, capital, and other inputs in pursuit of an
economic objective.").
346 See Meese, supra note 63, at 134-41 (explaining how partial contractual integration
can overcome costs of relying upon atomistic competition to conduct economic activity).
347 See Bork, Rule of Reason II, supra note 73, at 430-38 (explaining how exclusive
territories can encourage promotional expenditures by dealers by overcoming free rider
problem).
348 See Bork, Rule of Reason I, supra note 56, at 434-35.
349 See supra notes 338-45 and accompanying text; see also Cheung, supra note 339, at
5-6 (explaining employment contract as organizational form that minimizes transaction
costs).
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mimmlZlng costs-not to exercise market power. 350 To be sure,
numerous nonstandard agreements bind two or more independent
firms. Here again, however, there appears to be no evidence establishing or even suggesting that most such agreements arise in markets
structured in a manner conducive to the acquisition or maintenance of
market power. In fact, the vast majority of rule-of-reason claims fail
for lack of proof that the restraint produces harm.351
Of course, where section 2 is involved, courts will not inquire into
the effects-pro or con-of a monopolist's conduct unless the plaintiff
first proves that, in fact, the defendant possesses monopoly power. 352
However, the mere fact that a defendant is a monopolist is no reason
to assume that all or most of its practices reflect anything other than
efforts to minimize costs. Even proponents of a purchaser welfare
standard have conceded that firms may obtain and maintain a
monopoly through benign conduct. 353 Indeed, as Herbert Hovenkamp
has explained, even firms that become dominant by means of exclusionary conduct usually also engage in conduct that is procompetitive
in some respects. 354 It is easier to maintain a monopoly if you are also
selling an attractive product. 355 Thus, the mere fact that a monopolist
350 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 22 (1979) (finding
that fact that challenged restraint had also been adopted by firms without market power
militated in favor of rule-of-reason scrutiny); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van
Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) (holding that absence of market
power by parties to challenged agreement requires inference that restraint produces benefits); see also Coase, supra note 338, at 394-95 (arguing that competition between market
actors will result in optimal degree of contractual integration).
351 See Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999
BYU L. REv. 1265, 1268 (reporting that eighty-four percent of rule-of-reason cases studied
in exhaustive survey failed at initial stage because of lack of proof of anticompetitive
harm).
352 See United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380 (1956)
(stating that proof of monopoly power is necessary to establish unlawful monopolization).
353 See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text (noting formative era assumption
that efficient conduct could lead to at least temporary monopoly).
354 HoVENKAMP, supra note 88, at 197 ("It is usually very difficult for a nondominant
firm to become dominant simply by doing anticompetitive things. In most cases such firms
also have superior products or lower costs than their rivals, at least during the period when
their monopoly is developing."). Indeed, in the Microsoft case, both the government and
the courts had trouble distinguishing between the impact of plainly procompetitive conduct, such as product improvements and low prices, on the one hand, and exclusive dealing
and tying contracts, on the ot:ter. Both categories of conduct tended to increase
Microsoft's market share at the expense of Netscape's share. It bas been suggested that
Microsoft's efforts to thwart Netscape's so-called middleware strategy might have succeeded even absent any of the conduct that the courts found to be unlawful. See Meese,
supra note 153, at 769-70.
355 Microsoft may well provide an example of this phenomenon. While the firm may
have engaged in anticompetitive conduct properly condemned under section 2, there is no
dispute that the firm had also engaged in a significant amount of beneficial conduct.
Indeed, when reviewing a consent decree proposed by the United States, the D.C. Circuit
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has entered an exclusive dealing contract, for instance, is no reason to
presume that the arrangement is anything other than a "normal" or
"ordinary" practice that reduces costs. 356 Indeed, one proponent of a
purchaser welfare approach to unilateral conduct has, in other contexts, explained that the existence of a concentrated market is simply
one of several conditions necessary for a successful effort to raise the
costs of one's rivals and thus acquire or protect market power. 3 5 7
The insights offered by TCE would seem to undermine the case
for the application of a more forgiving standard to competition on the
merits and other unilateral conduct challenged under section 2. Like
partial contractual integration, for instance, a unilateral refusal to deal
can deprive a monopolist's rivals of key inputs. Both also presumptively produce significant benefits, and mistaken condemnation will
injure purchasers in the relevant market as well as the rest of society.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that courts have any special
competence in distinguishing harmful concerted action from that
which produces benefits. Indeed, history is replete with instances in
which courts-and even expert enforcement agencies-condemned
agreements that likely produced benefits, often in spite of defendants'
explanations of the restraints' beneficial consequences. 358 Thus, any
disparate treatment of unilateral exclusionary conduct, on the one
emphasized that it did not disagree with the assertion by the United States that Microsoft
had obtained its monopoly by means of lawful, procompetitive conduct. United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Brief for Appellant United
States at 4, Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Nos. 95-5037, 95-5039) ("[T]here was
no basis for an antitrust challenge to Microsoft's acquisition of monopoly power in the
market for operating system software for IBM-compatible personal computers .... ").
Moreover, the government supported its assertion with an affidavit from Nobel Laureate
Kenneth Arrow. See Declaration of Kenneth Arrow at 11, Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (No. 95-5037), available at www.justice.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/2517.pdf ("Clearly,
the six-fold growth in the installed base [of consumers using the Windows Operating
System] is primarily the result of the extraordinary commercial success of the IBMcompatible PC platform, in which Microsoft's product development and marketing played
a part.").
356 See supra notes 340-50 and accompanying text.
357 See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 34, at 253-66 (discussing numerous necessary
conditions for sucessful strategy of raising rivals' costs).
358 See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 602-08 (1972) (declaring horizontal division of territories ancillary to legitimate joint venture unlawful per se); cf Brief
for Topco Assocs., Inc. at 21-23, United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)
(No. 70-82) (explaining in intricate detail how restraints in question counteracted free
riding (citing Bork, Rule of Reason I, supra note 56)); see also FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384
U.S. 316, 320-21 (1966) (finding that exclusive dealing contract involving only one percent
of nation's shoe retailers offended "the central policy of ... the Sherman Act" that all
market segments be open to all competitors). Moreover, in some cases, defendants themselves may not be able to explain the rationale for the challenged conduct. See
Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 5-6 (stating that defendants often do not know why given
practice is successful, only that it is).
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hand, and that which flows from concerted action, on the other, would
seem to rest on "formalistic line drawing" and not on the respective
economic consequences of such conduct. 359 Therefore, one would not
expect well-considered section 2 doctrine to reflect disparate treatment of some forms of purported exclusion.

3.

The Supreme Court's Rejection of a Bifurcated Standard

One need not rely upon these more theoretical arguments, however, to reject the "bifurcation" account of current law. It seems absolutely plain that courts, including the Supreme Court, have rejected
the proffered distinction between unilateral conduct and concerted
action. Put another way, the standards that courts apply to both sets of
conduct entail a rejection of a purchaser welfare standard. If there
were any doubt on this question, the Supreme Court resolved it in
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. 360 There, the
defendant, with a market share of over ninety percent, allegedly
employed tying contracts (concerted action) and refusals to deal (unilateral conduct) to maintain its monopoly share of the market. 361 The
Supreme Court articulated the uniform standard governing the defendant's conduct as entailing two elements: "(1) the possession of
monopoly power in the relevant market, and (2) the willful acquisition
or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident." 362 After finding that the plaintiffs had satisfied the
first element by proving monopoly power, the Court fleshed out the
second element of the offense, defining it as "the use of monopoly
power 'to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or
to destroy a competitor.' "363
The Court then applied this standard in light of the evidence of
tying and refusals to deal that the plaintiff had adduced in response to
the summary judgment motion. The Court opined that the plaintiff's
evidence would support a finding that "Kodak took exclusionary
action to maintain its parts monopoly and used its control over parts
to strengthen its monopoly share of the Kodak service market. " 364
Given this conclusion, the Court said: "Liability turns, then, on
359 See supra note 331 and accompanying text (collecting authorities for proposition that
distinctions drawn by antitrust doctrine should not rest on formalistic line drawing).
360 504 u.s. 451 (1992).
361 /d. at 456-58.
362 /d. at 481 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).
363 /d. at 482-83 (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948)).
364 /d. at 483.
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whether 'valid business reasons' can explain Kodak's actions." 365 The
Court reiterated this point in a footnote, citing Aspen Skiing for the
proposition that a monopolist could refuse to deal with its rivals whenever "there are legitimate competitive reasons for the refusal. " 366
Aspen Skiing, of course, had derived its test from the Areeda-Turner
treatise. 367
According to this Harvard-inspired valid business reasons test,
undisputed proof that the refusals to deal and tying contracts produced significant benefits would have entitled Kodak to summary
judgment.368 This was so even though the plaintiff's evidence showed
(and Kodak did not dispute) that the refusals and tying excluded the
plaintiffs from the market and strengthened Kodak's monopoly "share
of the Kodak service market. " 369 The Court did not suggest that the
finder of fact should balance any benefits of Kodak's conduct against
the harms produced by such exclusion or the strengthening of its
monopoly power. Nor did the Court suggest or imply that the analysis
should turn on the conduct's impact on price.370 Instead, the question
was simply whether the restraint produced benefits.
The Court did add one caveat to the valid business reasons test, a
caveat that actually confirms its implicit rejection of the purchaser
welfare standard: In applying the test to the evidence that Kodak
adduced, the Court employed a less restrictive alternative standard.
Thus, even though Kodak brought forth evidence that its conduct produced some benefits, the Court nonetheless rejected Kodak's bid for
summary judgment, because there was evidence that Kodak could
have achieved the very same objectives by means of a less restrictive
alternative. 371 Of course, the invocation of such an alternative
depends upon an assumption that the benefits of the restraint necessarily coexist with its harms; otherwise there would be no reason to
assume the restraint is "restrictive" and require the defendant to
achieve these benefits via other means. 372
/d. Ironically, the Court cited Alcoa for this proposition.
/d. at 483 n.32.
367 See supra notes 248-54 and accompanying text.
368 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483-85 (discussing benefits that Kodak attributed to
its conduct).
369 /d. at 483.
370 Cf NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 114 (1984) (holding
that benefits purportedly produced by restraint did not counterbalance harms for purposes
of section 1 rule-of-reason analysis given factual finding that restraint resulted in prices
higher than they otherwise would have been).
371 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 484-86.
372 Meese, supra note 153, at 761; see also Meese, supra note 63, at 168 ("An assertion
that alternatives are more competitive depends upon the assumption that the restraints in
question actually injure competition in the first place.").
365

366
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Still, despite this assumption that any benefits coexist with harms,
the Court nonetheless eschewed balancing, making it plain that proof
of benefits that could not be achieved in some other way would entitle
Kodak to judgment in its favor. Such an approach stands in stark contrast to that employed in the section 1 context, where courts often at
least say that they will "balance" or "weigh" any of a restraint's benefits against its harms. 373 Thus, Eastman Kodak cannot be squared with
a purchaser welfare balancing test.
Lower courts have repeatedly employed a Kodak-like standard
when evaluating alleged exclusionary agreements. Consider the Third
Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Dentsply International,
Inc. 374 There the United States challenged a series of exclusive
dealing contracts under section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Third
Circuit found that the defendant possessed a monopoly and that the
challenged agreements had "a significant effect in preserving [the
defendant's] monopoly." 375 The court repeated its earlier assertion
that the defendant could nonetheless prevail if it established a "business justification." 376 The court did not mention any requirement that
the benefits of the justified behavior outweigh the harms produced by
the restraint or that the restraint result in any particular price level.377
B.

Microsoft

What, though, about the Microsoft decision, 378 which some cite as
evidence for a purchaser welfare balancing test? 379 There the United
States challenged numerous tactics that Microsoft employed to disadvantage Netscape, then the leading seller of Internet browsers. Such
tactics included tying agreements, primary dealing contracts, and a
policy of giving Microsoft's browser away for free. 3 so After affirming
the trial court's finding that Microsoft possessed monopoly power, the
D.C. Circuit went on to articulate "a general rule for distinguishing
373 See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (lOth Cir. 1998) ("[T]he harms and
benefits must be weighed against each other in order to judge whether the challenged
behavior is, on balance, reasonable." (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAw ')[1502
(1986})). But see infra note 404 (noting that more than ninety percent of rule-of-reason
cases involve no balancing whatsoever).
374 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005).
375 /d. at 191.
376 Id. at 196.
377 /d. at 196-97; see also Conwood Co., L.P. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 786-88
(6th Cir. 2002) (articulating defense for legitimate business justification); Trans Sport, Inc.
v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186, 189-91 (2d Cir. 1992) (same).
378 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
379 See, e.g., Salop, supra note 3, at 333-34.
380 See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58-78 (describing and evaluating various challenged
practices).
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between exclusionary acts, which reduce social welfare, and competitive acts, which increase it. "381 According to the court, sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act each implement "similar" standards of liability .382
The court then articulated a test similar in form to that employed
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 383 That is, once a plaintiff makes
out a prima facie case that the challenged conduct is exclusionary, the
burden shifts to the defendant to "proffer a 'procompetitive justification' for its conduct." 384 Such a justification, the court said, would
require a "nonpretextual claim that its conduct is indeed a form of
competition on the merits because it involves, for example, greater
efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal .... " 385 If the defendant does
assert such a benefit, the court said, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to rebut that claim. 386 If the plaintiff cannot rebut that claim
(that is, if the defendant's conduct in fact produces some benefits),
then the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that "the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive benefit. " 387
The balancing test that courts employ under section 1 of the Act at
least purports to condemn restraints that reduce purchaser welfare,
leading some to claim that Microsoft meant to employ a similar normative premise under section 2. 388
As an initial matter, the D.C. Circuit has no authority to reject
the standard announced in Eastman Kodak and Aspen Skiing, even if
it believes that standard to be incorrect and that the Supreme Court
itself would abandon that standard upon further examination. 389 In
any event, nothing in the Microsoft decision implies the embrace of a
purchaser welfare standard to the exclusion of a total welfare standard. To be sure, the opinion speaks of balancing anticompetitive
harms against procompetitive benefits. In this sense, the opinion
departs from Eastman Kodak, Aspen Skiing, and other decisions that
eschew such weighing of costs and benefits. 390 However, the language
in question may technically be dicta, since the court did not actually
engage in such balancing even though it evaluated numerous allegedly
/d. at 58.
/d. at 59.
383 /d.
384 /d. (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483
381

382

(1992)).
385 See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59.
386

387

/d.
/d.

388 See Salop, supra note 3, at 333-34 (arguing that D.C. Circuit adopted purchaser welfare balancing test in Microsoft).
389 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (stating that lower courts should
adhere to Supreme Court precedents even if they believe Court will reverse itself).
390 See supra notes 248-67 and accompanying text.
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exclusionary practices. 391 Moreover, a standard requiring the weighing
of costs against benefits simply raises the question of how exactly to
define and measure these competing effects. Under a total welfare
approach, for instance, the finder of fact would balance the benefits
produced by the conduct against the harm in the form of any deadweight allocative loss produced by enhanced market power. 392 A purchaser welfare approach, by contrast, would entail balancing the
efficiency effects of the restraint against any reduction in purchaser
welfare caused by market power, focusing on the price resulting from
the challenged activities.393
While the Microsoft court was not entirely clear on this question,
the opinion seemed to take a total welfare approach. 394 For one thing,
the court began its discussion of the definition of "anticompetitive
conduct" by endorsing the safe harbor for the creation of a "superior
product, business acumen, or historical accident," without balancing
the benefits of such conduct against harms or otherwise seeking to
determine the impact of such conduct on the welfare of purchasers. 395
The Court also quoted, with approval, the dicta from Alcoa to the
effect that "[t]he successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins." 396 Moreover, the court
described its task-and that of any antitrust court-as "distinguishing
between exclusionary acts, which reduce social welfare, and competitive acts, which increase it." 397 To be sure, the court held that proof of
an anticompetitive effect requires proof that a practice "harm[s] the
competitive process and thereby harm[s] consumers. " 398 Such proof,
however, was merely a necessary condition for liability, sufficient only
to establish a prima facie case. 399 Defendants could rebut such a case,
the court said, by proving that the conduct was in fact "a form of competition on the merits because it involves, for example, greater efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal .... " 400 Even if the defendant
391 See Gavil, supra note 8, at 22-23 (arguing that Microsoft court did not engage in
balancing when analyzing Microsoft's conduct).
392 See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
393 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
394 See Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 153 (opining that Microsoft formulation, while
"elaborate ... is also fairly unfocused, in that it does not specify criteria for harm to
competition or the competitive process"); Gavil, supra note 8, at 23 ("Microsoft offers little
specific guidance on how [the] balance should be struck.").
395 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
396 /d. at 58 (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,430 (2d Cir.
1945)).
397 /d. (emphasis added).
398 !d. (emphasis omitted).
399 See id. at 58-59.
400 /d. at 59 (emphasis added).
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proves such benefits, the plaintiff could still prevail by proving that
the restraint's harms outweigh its benefits. 401 Nowhere does the court
define "harm" for this purpose as harm to purchasers in the relevant
market, nor does it equate the "social" welfare expressly embraced by
the opinion with the welfare of purchasers in the relevant market-a
mere subset of society. Indeed, the court's reference to a rebuttal
based upon enhanced efficiency without regard to whether such efficiencies were passed on to consumers would seem to reflect a total
welfare standard. In short, there is little evidence to support the claim
that the Microsoft court somehow departed from the Supreme Court's
focus on total welfare.
Finally, section 1's seeming reliance on a purchaser welfare standard does not compel a different result. Microsoft itself merely opined
that its test was "similar" to that employed under section 1.402 And
even under section 1, actual balancing is rare indeed. Data suggest
that most rule-of-reason cases fail because plaintiffs cannot prove that
the challenged restraint produces harm in the first place.403 Even
when plaintiffs succeed in making out a prima facie case of harm, balancing is still exceedingly rare; proof that a restraint produces benefits
that could not be achieved in a different manner nearly always entitles
the defendant to judgment.404
In any event, recognition that courts have embraced different
normative standards under sections 1 and 2 respectively does not
thereby establish that the standard currently articulated (but almost
never applied) under section 1 should prevail. One might just as well
assert that section 2's standard, including its safe harbor for "normal"
conduct, should control. This was, after all, the test originally
announced under the rule of reason. 405 Further, if, as suggested earlier, most economic activity is in fact unilateral in nature, and therefore not subject to section 1, the total welfare standard currently
governs most business behavior. Perhaps this Article's conclusions
401 !d.; see also id. at 67 ("The plaintiff bears the burden not only of rebutting a proffered justification but also of demonstrating that the anticompetitive effect of the challenged action outweighs [the procompetitive benefits].").
402 See id. at 59.
403 See Carrier, supra note 351, at 1268 (reporting after exhaustive survey that eightyfour percent of rule-of-reason cases fail for lack of proof of anticompetitive harm); see also
Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 34, at 278 (asserting that consideration of efficiencies
under rule of reason generally entails "subjecting assertions of anticompetitive effects to
close scrutiny," not balancing).
404 Carrier, supra note 351, at 1267-68, 1272-73, 1349-57 (reporting that only four percent of rule-of-reason cases, in sample of nearly five hundred cases, entailed actual balancing of harms against benefits and reporting that only one rule-of-reason case in
previous four years entailed actual balancing of harms and benefits).
405 See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
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about the source and durability of section 2's total welfare standard
should cause courts to reassess their apparent commitment to protecting purchasers instead of society in that small subset of cases governed by section 1.
CoNcLusioN
Before offering to reform the law, one first needs to know what
the law is. Several antitrust scholars and lawyers have recently argued
that the case law under section 2 of the Sherman Act reflects a purchaser welfare approach to antitrust-that is, an effort to maximize
the welfare of those individuals who happen to purchase in the market
purportedly monopolized by the defendant. Some of these same
scholars claim that support for the alternative total welfare account
originated with the Chicago School of antitrust analysis and that only
Chicagoans support such a standard.
The choice between these two competing normative premises is
of significant practical import. Selection of a total welfare standard
implies a safe harbor for competition on the merits and any other conduct that makes economic sense separate and apart from any expectation of acquiring or maintaining monopoly power. Conversely,
embrace of a purchaser welfare standard would entail application of a
consumer welfare balancing test. Under this test, courts would balance
any benefits produced by a challenged practice against its harms,
judged by the impact of the challenged practice upon the welfare of
purchasers in the relevant market. Thus, a practice that enhanced the
overall welfare of society would nonetheless be unlawful if it reduced
the welfare of purchasers in the relevant market.
This Article has sought to demonstrate that section 2 doctrine as
it currently stands reflects a total welfare approach to antitrust law.
Indeed, no decision of which the author is aware has embraced a purchaser welfare approach to section 2. As a result, embrace of a purchaser welfare standard would call into question numerous decisions
and resulting legal rules designed to maximize society's welfare-decisions on which myriad firms and individuals have relied.
This commitment to maximizing total social wealth is not a recent
phenomenon associated with the Chicago School. Instead, the total
welfare standard is deeply rooted in section 2 law, tracing its origin to
the formative era of antitrust law. Furthermore, some scholars have
overstated the role of Robert Bork and the Chicago School in developing the total welfare approach. Instead of Chicago, it was the
Harvard School of antitrust analysis, steeped in neoclassical price
theory, that led the charge for a total welfare approach to antitrust
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generally and under section 2 in particular, beginning in the 1950s.
Since that time, courts have relied upon the work of Harvard scholars
to justify the application of section 2 tests that reflect a total welfare
standard to various forms of conduct. Such an approach is not limited
to competition on the merits or unilateral conduct more generally, but
instead applies across the board to nonstandard contracts such as
exclusive dealing and tying as well. Finally, even if a purchaser welfare
standard were to supply a better account of the original meaning of
the Sherman Act, considerations of stare decisis counsel strongly
against jettisoning the total welfare standard. Those who would undo
this modern consensus bear the heavy burden of explaining why so
many have been so wrong for so long.

